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Abstract

The Effect of Transactive Memory and Collective Efficacy
on Aircrew Performance
by
Daryl Raymond Smith
Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee:
Professor Terence R. Mitchell
Department of Management and Organization
The use of teams is becoming prevalent in American organizations. The United States
Air Force for example, employs aircrew teams on the majority of their aircraft. This
thesis focuses on system and motivational variables that influence the performance of
aircraft teams. Two potentially important team variables are identified and examined in
three research studies. Transactive memory is a system which combines the knowledge
possessed by individual team members with a shared awareness of who knows what,
who is good at what, and who does what. Collective efficacy is the group's collective
belief that it can perform a specific task. This research tests these two constructs as
competing constructs in explaining team performance. A laboratory and two field
studies are conducted to determine the effects of transactive memory and collective
efficacy on team performance. The results indicate that transactive memory has a
consistent and positive relationship with performance across studies. However, the
relationship failed to reach statistical significance due to small sample sizes. Change in
the composition of the team due to turnover is shown to be detrimental to transactive
memory. In addition, transactive memory makes important contributions to the team's
collective efficacy. In operational environments. collective efficacy is significantly
related to higher performance. A confident team is a more effective team. These results
are discussed in terms of their theoretical and practical significance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The use of teams is becoming more prevalent in United States businesses.
Osterman (1994) found that more than 50% of U.S. business organizations use teams.
Within those, 40% report that over half of the company's employees work in teams. The
military employs teams widely as well. The basic Army unit is the platoon. The Navy
has SEAL teams and submarine crews, while the Air Force has multiple flight crews.
Commensurate with this increased use of teams has been an increase of research on
teams. The key words "teams" and "teamwork" resulted in 29 references in the Academy
of Management Journal and Review since 1990. The number of references increased to
54 when Administrative Science Quarterly and Journal of Applied Psychology were
added. With the increased popularity of the use of teams, it is important as
organizational behaviorists to understand what makes an effective team. To this end,
theorists have identified several potentially important variables, including transactive
memory and collective efficacy, which may separate the exceptional team from the
average team.
Transactive memory (Wegner, 1987) is a system which combines the knowledge
possessed by individual team members with a shared awareness of who knows what,
who is good at what, and who does what. Collective efficacy is the group's collective
belief that it can perform a specific task (Lindsley, Mathieu, Heffner, Brass, 1994). Both
of these constructs have been shown ro be positively related to team performance.
However, the majority of the studies conducted have been confined to the laboratory.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of both transactive memory and
collective efficacy in the performance of both nominal and natural occurring teams in
both the laboratory and the field.
In the following sections, I define key terms and variables and then present a
brief history of both transactive memory and collective efficacy research. I review both
theoretical and empirical work. The major focus is upon transactive memory with
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collective efficacy (the more well established construct) serving as a gauge of the
effectiveness of transactive memory in the team - performance relationship. I then
propose several hypotheses to extend our knowledge of the importance of transactive
memory and collective efficacy as contributors to team performance. Next, I review a
series of three studies to investigate these hypotheses. The first is a lab study using a
PC-based simulator and actual military aviators working as a team to successfully
complete a mission. Studies 2 and 3 are field tests of these constructs using KC-135 air
refeuling aircraft crews at two different Air Force bases in order to determine if these
constructs help to separate the exceptional from the average aircrew. The results and
discussions of these three studies are presented in tum. In conclusion, the results of the
three studies are compared and summarized and practical implications, as well as
directions for future research, are discussed.

-----------------------------------------~---------
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Teams

Teams Defined. What constitutes a team and does a team differ from a group?
There are many definitions of a team, but I choose to use the following: " ... a
distinguishable set of two or more individuals who interact dynamically,
interdependently and adaptively to achieve specified, shared, and valued objectives"
(Brannick, Roach, and Salas, 1993, p. 287). The emphasis on interdependence and
interaction is what separates a team from a group. For example, a life insurance
organization may have a sales group. There may be seven salespersons in the group who
each independently seek out new insurance policies from individuals. If each of these
persons independently acts in accomplishing his or her tasks, then this is best known as a
"group" and not a "team". This label is used regardless of the fact that each individual
may share the same building, have a cubicle in the same room, report to the same
~upervisor, and be referred to as the "sales team" by the CEO. The fact that salespeople
are not interdependent in accomplishing their tasks or objectives makes this a group.
Contrast the sales group with the top management team (TMT) on a strategic planning
retreat. This group including the Vice President of Sales. Finance, Accounting,
Marketing, and the CEO. All act dynamically and interdependently in pursing valued
and shared objectives (in this case setting strategic goals for the company). Probably the
clearest example of a team is a coronary surgical unit. Each set of surgeons, doctors, and
nurses acts dynamically and interdependently to accomplish an open heart surgery ..
Interdependence is the key distinguishing feature of a team. Having distinguished the
terms, they will be used interchangeably from this point forward. However, the use of
the term group for this present study will be synonymous with the term "team" as
defined above.
While there has been much written on teams, Organizational Behaviorists have
failed to give users of teams direction when assembling and monitoring teams (Church,
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1996). One reason for this oversight is the fact that teams, like diamonds, have many
facets (e.g. demographics, size, leader vs. leaderless, processes, structure, development,
boundaries, context). Theoretical work on teams has offered models of team
effectiveness with associated categories of variables important for teams (Sundstrom,
DeMeuse, Futrell, 1990; Goodman, Ravlin, Schminke, 1987). For the purposes of this
proposal I will briefly cover some of the categories· of variables examined in the
literature in order to provide a context for the constructs of interest.
Categories of Team Variables
There have been many attempts to theoretically model team effectiveness
(Goodman, et al., 1987; Sundstrom et al., 1990; Hackman, 1983). Campion, Medsker,
and Higgs (1993) have gone a step further than others by not only presenting a
theoretical framework for understanding team effectiveness, but by also testing the
framework on diverse samples. They hypothesized that work team characteristics would
be related to effectiveness. They found support for this hypothesis with both nonexempt
administrative support jobs in a large financial services company (Campion et al., 1993)
and exempt professional (knowledge worker) jobs in an insurance company (Campion,
Papper, and Medsker, 1996). Their work is helpful in establishing a framework of team
variables and thereby providing a context in which to understand the studies that follow.
The categories of work team characteristics they studied are a follows: Job Design,
Interdependence, Composition, Context, and Process. In the first study Campion et al.
(1993) found that Job Design (e.g. self-management, participation, task variety, etc.) was
the most important category of variables associated with team effectiveness. The second
most important category of variables were Process variables (e.g. collective efficacy, and
communication/ cooperation within the team). The Process category reflects those
things that go on in the team to influence effectiveness.
Interestingly, in the second study (Campion et al., 1996) the Process variables
were found to be the most potent predictor of effectiveness of any category of variables
(followed closely by Job Design). Relationships between Process characteristics and
effectiveness criteria were even higher with the professional workers than they were for
the nonexempt administrative workers. Campion et al. ( 1996) conclude by vigorously
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arguing that managers monitor and encourage positive team processes to increase team
effectiveness. The manager must concentrate on the Process variables, especially if Job
Design is not malleable.
Campion et al. ( 1996) highlight the importance of the Process category of team
variables. The manager who wishes to enhance effectiveness should take heed. Within
this category there seems to be at least two different types of variables at work. There is
the idea of a network or a system (social support, communication, coordination) and the
idea of motivation (group potency or collective efficacy). I will examine the idea that
team motivation and team systems/networks are both important in team performance. I
have selected one construct from each of these types for examination; transactive
memory (a systems type construct) and collective efficacy (a motivational construct).
These constructs are expanded upon in the following sections.

Transactive Memory-Theoretical Work
The roots of the construct transactive memory go back to an early and influential
theory of group behavior known as the group mind (Wegner, 1987). Rousseau (1767)
and Hegel ( 1807) assumed that groups, like individuals, had a form of mental activity
that guides action. Many of the early pioneers (e.g. Wundt) who contributed to modem
social psychology held this viewpoint (Wegner, 1987). Whereas group mind theorists
had emphasized the similarity of individual minds as a hallmark of the group mind,
transactive memory describes a social network of individual minds that transcends such
uniform agreement. A transactive memory system connects disparate minds. It places
direct emphasis on the social organization of diversity rather than on the social
destruction of diversity (Wegner, 1987). It is important to emphasize that transactive
memory is not a group mind in the sense of groupthink (Janis, 1972) or perhaps more
accurately stated an overemphasis on agreement and lack of divergent opinions (Fuller &
Aldag, 1998). Rather it is a linking of disparate minds in an attempt to process and
structure information (Wegner, 1987).
Wegner ( 1987) was the first to formally propose the construct of transactive
memory, which was a fresh approach to the idea of a group mind. The group mind idea
had been buried during the behavioral revolution of the 1930s (Wegner, 1987) and is
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beginning to return to favor (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). The study of transactive
memory has as its goal the prediction of group (and individual) behavior through an
understanding of the manner in which groups process and structure information
(Wegner, 1987). As first defined, a transactive memory system is a set of individual
memory systems in combination with the communication that takes place between
individuals (Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel, 1985). In sum, transactive memory is
concerned with how a team acquires, stores, and handles information.
The term memory is employed because the team must encode, store, and retrieve
information as a group, just as in individual memory (Wegner, 1987). But, why the term
transactive?
The transactive quality of memory in a group is evident in the transactions
that take place during encoding and retrieval. In transactive encoding,
people discuss incoming information, determining where and in what
form it is to be stored in the group ... the very nature of incoming
information can be changed, translated into a form that the group can
store. Transactive retrieval, in turn requires determining the location of
information and sometimes entails the combination or interplay of items
coming from multiple locations (Wegner, 1987, p. 190).

Transactive memory uses an external memory system (Wegner, 1987). We store
as much outside our minds as within them. There are two requirements for external
memory. First there must be a label or retrieval cue (e.g. "Tom's phone number"). The
second requirement of external memory is the location of the item (e.g. "in the
rolodex"). In contrast, internal encoding requires a label and the item. Therefore, other
people can be locations of external storage for the individual. Another person can be
used much like a library book. The book can be accessed for the information located
within the volume. The interdependence produced by a transactive memory system
produces knowledge-holding system that is larger and more complex than either of the
individual's own memory systems (Wegner, 1987).
Wegner ( 1987) goes on to elaborate on the features of transactive memory. First,
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transactive memory is a property of the team. It is a constructed system which is built up
over time by individual constituents. This construction is a fairly automatic consequence
of social perception and interaction. Once in place, it can impact what the group as a
whole can remember. In a nutshell, transactive memory is a group informationprocessing system.
A number of researchers have begun to study and theorize about transactive
memory, led by Moreland (Moreland, Argote, Krishnan, 1998; Rulke & Rau, 1997;
Moreland, Argote, Krishnan, 1996; Liang, Moreland, Argote, 1995; Wegner, Erber,
Raymond, 1991). Moreland et al. (1998) have continued to develop this idea that people·
supplant their own memories with external aids. Members of a team can use other
members as a memory aid so that important information will not be forgotten (Wegner,
1987). When individual members cannot remember a certain piece of information or are
uncertain about the accuracy of such information, they can tum to another member for
help. This transactive memory system combines the knowledge possessed by individual
group members with a shared awareness of who knows what.
The definition of transactive memory began to develop more fully with additional
theoretical and experimental work. Liang et al. (1995) define transactive memory as " ... a
combination of the knowledge possessed by particular group members and an awareness
of who knows what" (p. 385). Moreland et al. ( 1996) use a similar definition, where the
system combines the knowledge possessed by particular group members with a shared
awareness of who knows what. However, they go a step further. They trace the
development of transactive memory as a subset of a larger construct known as socially
shared cognition (to be discussed later). They then infer that the shared knowledge of
other group members would include "who is good at what" as well as "who knows
what". Rulke and Rau (1997) make it explicit when they define transactive memory as
the combination of the knowledge of particular group members combined with a shared
awareness of who knows what and who is good at what.
The above represents the present state of the construct definitionally. I would
extend the definition one step further. Since transactive memory deals with the
information between team members I would say it also includes "who does what''. This
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information is vital to the effective operating of a team. Recall that the term "team"
demands that the members be involved in interdependent tasks. For this interdependent
cooperation to occur the team members must realize who does what. Task roles may be
clearly defined (e.g. surgeon and nurse) in which case "who does what" is very clear. On
the other hand, tasks may be ill-defined and situationally determined (e.g. a Navy SEAL
team) whereby team members must determine "who does what". That brings us to the
final definition of transactive memory which will be used in the remainder of/this
proposal. Transactive memory is a system which combines the knowledge possessed by
individual team members with a shared awareness of who knows what. who is good at
what, and who does what in a team.
Note the words, "combines the knowledge possessed by individual team
members". The actual knowledge possessed by individual team members has been
shown to be key in identifying expertise in the group. Transactive memory is more than
a shared awareness; it also encompasses the individuals' knowledge, much like a library
book on a shelf. It is important to know which library book to pull down, but it is also
important for the library book to contain the knowledge.

Related Terms
Now that I have defined transactive memory, it may be helpful to differentiate it
from related terms. In other words, what is transactive memory not? Transactive
memory deals with knowledge among group members, however transactive memory is
not the same as tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that cannot be
articulated or codified very easily. This knowledge (usually) comes from direct
experience (e.g. riding a bicycle) (Polanyi, 1958, 1962). The idea began in the
evolutionary economics field and has been adapted by the organization theorists. It is a
useful metaphor which has been applied across organizational levels (Nelson & Winter,
1982).
I see two key relations between tacit knowledge and transactive memory. First,
the degree to which a transactive memory system is in place, may dictate how easily an
organization can articulate or codify its routines. Routines are very important to
organizations and most people discuss tacit knowledge in organizations in the
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framework of routines. If a good transactive memory system is in place, it may be easier
to codify the routine because people can identify where the information lies. Second, the
fact that some knowledge is tacit makes transactive memory all the more important. If I
can only know some things through direct experience, it is important then that I know
''who knows what". I can't know everything, especially things learned through direct
experience, but my teammates may possess that knowledge.
As alluded to earlier, transactive memory is not some sort of group mind in the
sense of groupthink (Janis, 1972). Groupthink in this context would refer to group
unanimity, solidarity in thought and too strong a desire to avoid contradictory ideas or
evidence. Recently, Fuller and Aldag ( 1998) have critiqued the concept of groupthink as
it has been articulated by Janis (1972). They cite a lack of empirical support for the
concept and propose that 'groupthink' as defined by Janis may not necessarily have
negative outcomes. Regardless of the validity of the construct of groupthink, it should
be clear that transactive memory is not referring to some type of groupthink construct
Transactive memory does not refer to similarity of individual minds, but rather
connections of disparate minds (Wegner, 1987).
There are a slough of similar terms to transactive memory: shared mental models,
team mental models, common cause maps. shared frames, teamwork schemas, and
sociocognition (Klimoski & Mohammed. 1994). The work in this area is not well
developed and therefore terms are often used interchangeable or without great precision.
I will attempt to address many of these terms, while attempting to not get bogged down.
The goal is a clear delineation of transactive memory from related terms.
Weick and Roberts (1993) use the term collective mind. They focus on the
collective mind as a system of behaviors which are heedfully interrelated. Their classic
example is the aircraft carrier where sailors must work in coordination to conduct
successful flight operations. "People act heedfully when they act more or less carefully,
critically, consistently, purposefully, attentively, studiously, vigilantly, conscientiously,
perniciously" (Weick & Roberts, 1993. p. 361). People can vary to the degree in which
they are heedful which directly relates to smooth operations or disasters. This is
different from transactive memory which focuses on knowledge and memory location
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and retention, while the collective mind focuses on behaviors and coordination.
Gruenfeld and Hollingshead (1993) assert that cognition is beginning to be
viewed as a collective rather than an individual phenomenon. They go on to say that
transactive memory is evidence of this change in approach to cognition. Moreland, et al.
( 1996) also conclude that cognition can occur as a collective phenomenon, they use the
term socially shared cognition and place transactive memory as a particular type of
socially shared cognition. Gruenfeld and Hollingshead (1993) employ the term, group

sociocognition, which is "social interaction that leads to an emergence of unique,
collectively produced conceptualizations that no individual has to begin with." Group
sociocognition differs from transactive memory in that transactive memory is not so
concerned about the production of information, but rather how the group stores and

processes information among its members. However, it is clear that both of these
constructs deal with information and knowledge.
One of the most popular team research topics is team mental models (Klimoski &
Mohammed. 1994). Different meanings are attached to this term and the seminal
treatment of the topic by Klimoski and Mohammed ( 1994) does not even attempt to
define it. However, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse (1993) have worked
extensively with Navy teams and provide the following definition. Team mental models
require that team members hold common or overlapping cognitive representations of
task requirements, procedures, and role responsibilities. Klimoski and Mohammed
( 1994) do define the generic term mental model as "a psychological representation of the
environment and its expect behavior" (p. 405). So from these definitions we may deduce
that transactive memory is a subset of team mental models, but not the same construct.
Team mental models deal with not only with knowledge among team members,
but also representations of tasks, situations. response patterns, the environment, and the
environment's expected behavior (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). Klimoski and
Mohammed 1 1994) suggest that the content of mental models are theories of situations
or of actions. So team mental models are focused on task behaviors and the environment
much more so than transactive memory. Transactive memory deals primarily with who
knows what. who is good at what, and who does what. It concerns itself with knowledge
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(or information) held within the group and is not focused primarily outside of the group.
The environment does supply incoming information into the group that the group must
process, but again transactive memory focuses on information inside the group. Since
team mental models are focused on certain tasks and how they interact with the
environment, it would seem logical that an effective transactive memory system would
be critical to an effective team mental model. Transactive memory would store the
knowledge which would allo~ the team to interact with the task and environment. But
again, team mental models encompass more than transactive memory systems, the
environment and tasks. Admittedly, the lines between transactive memory and team
mental models become blurred, but I am taking a "first cut" at separating the two. The
field as a whole has not yet clearly delineated the two (or made an attempt to do so).
Shared mental model is the final term to be discussed. Shared mental models
may be defined as follows, " ... group members typically have some sort of organized
knowledge structures relating to various aspects of the group's situation, such as their
task, their environment, and their fellow group members" (Peterson, Mitchell,
Thompson, Burr, 1996, p. 5). Again we see the notion that shared mental models deal
not only with knowledge about fellow group members, but also about the task and the
environment. This is what separates transactive memory from shared mental models.
Transactive memory deals primarily with knowledge and information among group
members and is focused within the group. Now that transactive memory has been clearly
delineated, I return to the discussion of theoretical treatment of transactive memory.

Transactive memory features
How exactly is a transactive memory system constructed? It begins when
individuals learn something about each others' domains of expertise (Wegner, 1987).
Stereotypes are the default (Wegner. et al., 1991) and serve as the first building block,
though they are not necessarily accurate. Over time conversation and observation allow
members to discern with precision who is expert in what domain. This perception of
relative expertise of self and others requires self-disclosure lWegner et al., 1991). The
individual with the relevant expertise can become the storage tank for that knowledge.
Knowledge of team member's access to information is also an important tool in building
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transactive memory. Access to information can lead to responsibility for the
information. If no one individual seems to "be the expert" and access to information is
not clear, negotiated entries occur (Wegner et al, 1991). In negotiated entries one person
agrees to accept responsibility for the information. Responsibility is key in building the
transactive memory system, "the system can be built because individuals in a group
accept responsibility for knowledge" (Wegner, 1987, p. 194).
Rulke and Rau ( 1997) found support for the theoretical explanation for how
transactive memory systems form. They found that early in group interactions on a new
task, group members spent·a great deal of communication on declaring expertise and
coordinating / planning. The information encoding process seems to consist of small
spiral encoding cycles of question-expertise-coordination.
In sum, Wegner (1987) asserts thaUhe person who will be the acknowledged
location of a set of labeled knowledge will primarily established through expertise.
Rulke and Rau' s ( 1997) work supports this contention. If no expertise is established the
group will rely on circumstantial knowledge responsibility (or individual access to
information). Or, the group will fall back on how the knowledge has been encountered
in the group (e.g. the finance reports seem to come through Dave). Finally, if expertise
and access are equal, the group must negotiate the entry to decide which individual will
hold responsibility. "An effective team will not leave responsibility for information to
chance" (Wegner, 1987, p. 192)
Work on antecedents and consequences of transactive memory is in its infancy.
Antecedents that have been proposed are mutual self-disclosure, frequent transaction and
dialogue, time, communication, and checks and interventions (e.g. teacher to student,
"are you with me") (Wegner, 1987; Wegner, et al., 1991). Wegner (1987) proposed that
satisfaction may be one consequence of a transactive memory. He reasoned that clear
differentiation of expertise should in tum lead to satisfaction. Furthermore, a mature
transactive memory system may be a sign of a successful team or relationship.
Liang, et al. ( 1995) theorized that a developed transactive memory system should
be exhibited by three key behavioral features. In other words, the knowledge of "who·
knows what" could be exhibited through three behaviors. From the behaviors, it can be
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inferred that a strong transactive memory system exists (Moreland, et al., 1998). The
first feature is memory differentiation which is the tendency of group members to
specialize in remembering distinct aspects of the task. Secondly, a developed transactive
memory system should result in task coordination where group members work smoothly
together on a task (e.g. greater cooperation, less confusion, etc.) Finally developed
transactive memory systems should exhibit high task credibility where group members
trust one another's knowledge about the task (e.g. few challenges to declared expertise).
Two studies have shown support for these key features (Liang et al, 1995; Moreland et
al, 1996).
Moreland et al. (1998) also theorized that teams with developed transactive
memory systems will reflect three (knowledge) indices concerning their belief system
about group member expertise. They assert that teams with transactive memory will
exhibit a complexity of beliefs about expertise. These teams will also show a higher
level of accuracy of those beliefs and a high level of agreement among team members
concerning those beliefs. Conversely a team with little or no transactive memory will
have a simple and incomplete set of beliefs concerning expertise. These beliefs will not
be accurate nor will they exhibit high levels of agreement. Moreland et al. ( 1998)
provide one study as empirical support for these knowledge indices.
Advantages and Disadvantages
Wegner ( 1987) enumerates several potential benefits of transactive memory.
First he points out the integration of knowledge: useful creative products can be
produced by transaction--they help manufacture new knowledge for the group. This is
similar to Gruenfeld and Hollingshead' s ( 1993) idea of group sociocognition.
Transactive memory also allows individual team members to gain access to new areas of
expertise. Finally, others in the group may 'catch', (i.e. note, acquire, and store)
incoming information that any one individual may miss, ensuring it is available for
future team use.
There are also several drawbacks to a strong transactive memory system
(Wegner. 1987). Errors can occur at all three stages of group information processing;
encoding. storage. and recall. Obviously this occurs at an individual level as well. but
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can be compounded by group level errors. There is also a potential new source of error,

incomplete specification of knowledge path responsibility (i.e. where this knowledge is
to be stored and who is responsible for it). Information may be inadvertently channeled
away from the expert, however this is more likely under a developing and immature
transactive memory system. Overconfidence can lead to an over estimation of its
capability by group members (i.e. trust that someone else has the information, when they
do not). Finally, and I think most importantly for organizations, a strong transactive
memory system infers that turnover can have grave effects. When a person leaves the
team, they depart with that store of knowledge leaving a gap in the transactive memory
system.
Transactive Memory - Empirical Work

Since transactive memory is a relatively new construct, little empirical work has
been done. For this reason the entire body of empirical work to date will be
summarized.
Wegner (1987) began transactive memory work on dating couples. He studied
recall in dating couples. Subjects were asked for area of expertise for self and partner;
The individuals then viewed items for either one minute or 30 seconds. This resulted in
a 2 X 2 design (Expertise--partner/self and Circumstantial Responsibility--partner/self).
Self expertise led to the greater number of remembered items, which is no surprise.
However, when subjects were circumstantially responsible for a topic (i.e. allowed
greater viewing time) they remembered more when they believed their partner was not
an expert in that topic. When they considered their partner an expert they "let the
information pass by" assuming that .the partner would pick it up. This provides evidence
that expertise seems to indicate where knowledge will be stored in the transactive
memory system.
Wegner's (1987) first study dealt with intact couples. He and his colleagues
(Wegner et al.. 1991) extended the study by comparing recall in intact (or natural)
couples versus those put together simply for the study (i.e. impromptu couples).

They

also manipulated expertise by either assigning expertise (or responsibility, without
regard to actual expertise) or not assigning expertise. This resulted in a 2 X 2 design as
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well (Pairs--natural or impromptu and Expertise--assigned or none). They found an
effect of expertise, natural couples remembered more than impromptu couples with no
assignment. Impromptu couples remembered more than natural couples with
assignment. There was also an interaction, natural couples without assignment
remembered more than with assignment. In impromptu couples there was no difference
in assignment mode (assignment was non-significantly greater).
Wegner et al. ( 1991) drew several conclusions from this study. First, for
assignment to improve memory performance in teams, it may require time and practice.
The assignment did help improve memory in impromptu couples, but it did not reach
statistical significance. The finding that assignment of expertise or responsibility
(regardless of expertise) was interesting. Natural couples without assignment
remembered significantly more than with assignment. It seems that items which fall
within the domain of expertise where given less than the usual attention, why? Perhaps
new assignment introduces uncertainty, or new assignment may introduce
overconfidence to ignore usual items. Perhaps, assignment interrupts the flow of
normally fluid cognitive processes. Wegner et al. (1991) called for further research into
the time and course of transactive memory development. It does seem clear that
imposing artificial structure into a natural team is counterproductive. While assignment
of structure to newly formed teams may be helpful.
Rulke and Rau ( 1997) answered this call for further research. They used a
laboratory study of undergraduates who were trained as individuals or in groups. The
task was the construction of an AM radio. One week after initial training, the subjects
again assembled a radio for the criterion trials. The training groups remained intact and
the individually trained subjects were put into groups for the radio assembly. Subject's
interaction was videotaped and later coded and analyzed. Expertise was found to be key
to transactive memory systems. Declaring expertise and coordinating/ planning were
found to be the largest categories of sentences spoken. Declaring expertise and acquiring
information about a domain of expertise took place during the earlier rather than later
periods of group interaction. Category of sentences spoken was influenced by category
spoken in previous periods. The encoding process seems to cons"ist of small spiral
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encoding cycles of question-expertise-coordination. The results of the study "suggest
that transactive memory is developed when shared experience is present and through an
transactive encoding process" (Rulke & Rau, 1997). The results also give direct support
to Wegner's (1987) hypothesis that discovery of expertise is a primary vehicle to the
. encoding of transactive memory.
Moreland and his colleagues have been involved with a serious of laboratory
studies to investigate transactive memory (Liang et al, 1995; Moreland et al, 1996;
Moreland et al., 1998). Their studies have been centered around two general hypotheses
(Moreland et al, 1998). One is that groups will perform better when their members are
trained together rather than apart. Two, the benefits of such training will depend largely
on the operation of transactive memory systems. Training people in groups allows the
interaction, self-disclosure, and communication necessary to build transactive memory
systems (Wegner et al., 1991).
All three of the Moreland studies utilized the AM radio assembly task employed
by Rulke and Rau (1997). Liang et al. (1995) compared teams originally trained as
individuals versus teams that were trained as teams. Through direct performance
measures (e.g. number of errors in assembly, procedural recall) it was clear that teams
trained as a group performed better. Meanwhile, videotape recording and analysis
revealed that teams trained together exhibited better memory differentiation, task
coordination, and task credibility. From these behavioral features, it was concluded that
such teams had stronger transactive memory systems. Regression analysis revealed that
group training improved group performance primarily through transactive memory
systems. Control variables included task motivation, group cohesion, and social identity.
These control variables did not effect the training - performance relationship. This was
the first study to demonstrate transactive memory with more than two people.
The next study in the series was nearly identical to the first (Moreland et al.,
1996) an~ was designed to rule out alternative explanations (i.e. those other than
transactive memory) for the results in study one. The second study employed four
groups of training: individual. team-building, ·re-assignment, and integral team. In the
individual condition, subjects were trained on the radio task individually and tested in a

17
group one week later. The second condition was identical to the individual condition,
except that after the individual training session, groups were formed and participated in a
short team building exercise (to develop a mentoring quiz for seniors to use during
freshman orientation). This exercise was used to encourage group development without
providing information about "who knows what".
The group training condition (integral team) was identical to study one (Liang et
al., 1995). A new condition was identical to the group training condition except that
subject teams were unexpectedly scrambled one week later. The researchers again found
that the group training condition produced the highest performance (the other conditions
did not differ) and that this performance difference was due to transactive memory. For
example, assembly errors were reduced by 50% in the group training condition. Memory
differentiation, task coordination, and task credibility were all higher for the group
training condition.
Evidence for transactive memory in the first two Moreland studies relied upon
the inference of transactive memory as a result of the three behavioral indications of
memory differentiation, task coordination, and task credibility. Study 3 (Moreland et al.,
1998) was designed to more directly tap the knowledge inherent in a developed
transactive memory system. The researchers wanted to get at exactly what team
members know about one another. This study used similar procedures to the previous
studies and employed two training conditions (group or individual). Subjects were then
brought back the next week. Subjects were then given a knowledge questionnaire
(discussed below) to assess their knowledge of other group members. Next subjects
completed a procedural recall sheet and then assembled a radio. However, contrary to
what they had been told in week one (and was done in the other two studies) this recall
sheet and subsequent assembly of the radio was done individually rather than in a group.
This was done in order to actually assess individual member's knowledge of radio
assembly procedures.
The knowledge questionnaire was used to produce three indices for each group.
The complexity of group member's beliefs about one another's radio expertise; the
accuracy of those beliefs; and the level of agreement within a group about the
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distribution of expertise. As hypothesized, members whose groups were trained together
rather than apart had significantly greater complexity, accuracy, and agreement in their
knowledge of other group members. This is direct evidence that group training helps to
develop transactive memory systems. Furthermore, the researchers found that these
direct measures (i.e. knowledge indices) of transactive memory were positively and
significantly correlated with the behavioral (or indirect) evidence of transactive memory
(i.e. memory differentiation, task coordination, and task credibility).
Though technically it was not transactive memory as defined in this present
proposal, Peterson et al.'s (1996) study on shared mental models (and group efficacy)
sheds some light on transactive memory. The researchers studied student groups
working on quarter-long research projects. They found that both group efficacy and
shared mental models predicted performance (measured as the final grade). Specifically
it was early group efficacy and shared mental models late in the quarter which predicted
performance in the longitudinal study. Furthermore, the predictors were not independent
of each other. Early group efficacy predicted later shared mental models which in tum
predicted performance. What is interesting is that the researcher's operationalization of
shared mental models was information-centered, making it very similar to transactive
memory.
Peterson et al. (1996) assessed shared mental models through a set of knowledge
type questions. Individuals in each team were asked to distribute points to each group
member on how much they contributed to the five task components of the project. This
Disagreement over contributions score can be thought of as "who does what". Egotism

was measured for each group as well to determine the extent to which group members
inflated their contributions. Again, this is a measure of "who does what". One would
expect that teams with better transactive memory systems would have higher agreement
on "who does what". A second shared mental model measure was used to rate the
importance of each of the five task components in order to produce an outstanding final
project. High level of agreement on this measure would indicate a shared awareness of
"who knows what", in this case, do we all know what is important? Groups with well
developed transactive memory systems should have high agreement on this score as well.
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Again, groups with better shared mental models (similar to transactive memory) late in
the quarter, produced better final projects. Shared mental models (or transactive
memory) was hypothesized to improve performance by improving group coordination.
This idea is supported by the work of Liang et al. ( 1995). One of their behavioral indices
of the presence of transactive memory, task coordination, was found to be related to
higher performance.
The closest that transactive memory empirical work has come to examining
natural teams in a field setting is Hollingshead's (1998) recent work with clerical office
workers. Hollingshead used clerical workers from a large university in a word
memorization task of work related words in a lab study. She found that subjects learn
and recall more information in their own areas of expertise when their partner had
different, rather than similar, work-related expertise. Furthermore, this effect reverses
for recall of information outside work-related expertise. These findings are similar to
Wegner et al.'s (1991) work with dating couples.
Though all the subjects were clerical workers, the workers were placed in
nominal teams by the researcher. This was done to manipulate the expertise of the
others on the team. This work was conducted as a lab study. However in addition to the
lab study, Hollingshead also surveyed workers concerning their own natural work
groups. The survey measured various items including group tenure and group size. The
survey also included a self report of the extent to which participants knew about each of
their coworker's areas of work-related knowledge and job responsibilities (seven-point
scale); and the extent to which there was shared agreement in their work group about
members' work-related expertise and job responsibilities (seven-point scale).
Hollingshead then correlated the self-reports with the predictor variables of group tenure
and size. Results indicate that group size is negatively correlated with knowing about
other group member's expertise as hypothesized. In contradiction to another hypothesis,
it was found that tenure was negatively correlated with perceived agreement in their
work group about members' expertise and job responsibilities. This was the first attempt
to examine natural teams. Though a step in the right direction, the study suffered from
common method variance. with the participant rating both the predictor and criterion
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variables. Furthermore, these findings were based on the reports of only one person
from the natural team.

Summary of Empirical Evidence
So in sum, what do we know empirically about transactive memory? We know
that it has been exhibited in laboratory studies (Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1991;
Liang et al., 1995; Moreland et al., 1996; Rulke & Rau, 1997; Moreland et al., 1998).
All of the studies have used undergraduate students and have been limited to memory
recall or completion of the same complex task (i.e. radio assembly). Transactive
memory has been exhibited in pairs (Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1991) or in teams of
three (Moreland et al., 1998). Transactive memory has been exhibited directly by
memory recall in dating couples (Wegner, 1987), indirectly through behavioral indices
(Liang et al., 1995; Moreland et al., 1996), and directly through knowledge indices
(Moreland·et al., 1998). Rulke and Rau (1997) and Wegner et al. (1991) have
demonstrated that the recognition of expertise seems key to the transactive memory
process and that transactive memory seems to develop through interactions over time.
There has been little or no research in the following areas. There has been no
field studies or simulations used to test transactive memory. Transactive memory has
not been tested on groups of more than three people and little has been done with natural
teams. Transactive memory has not been tested when roles are well-defined, though
Wegner et al. (1991) did impose artificial structure that could be remotely related to
roles. The effect of turnover was examined in passing (Moreland et al., 1996), but
nothing is known of its effects on transactive memory in well-developed teams over
time. A related turnover issue is one of teams that are reconstituted (formed and
reformed) on a regular basis. Clearly there are many issues to be explored in the
transactive memory field.

Collective Efficacy - Theoretical Work
The decade of the 1990s has brought considerable interest in the construct of
collective efficacy. The term has roots in Bandura's work in self efficacy (Bandura,
1977, 1986). Bandura ( 1977) originally defined self efficacy as, "the conviction that one
can successfully execute the behavior required to produce (particular) outcomes." Wood
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·and Bandura (1989) later added that self efficacy refers to beliefs in one's capabilities to
mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and course of action needed to meet given
situational demands. Bandura ( 1982) proposed that efficacy may also operate at the
group level and since that time researchers have strived to understand its relationship to
group performance. By 1997, Bandura asserted that indeed efficacy does operate at the
. group level and has similar sources, serves similar functions, and operates through
similar processes as does self efficacy.
Researchers have used a number of terms centered around this idea of member's
beliefs about the group: collective efficacy, group efficacy, collective or group esteem,
group potency, and group aspiration level (Guzzo, Yost, Campbell, 1993; Lindsley et al.
1994; Mischel & Northcraft, 1997; Little & Madigan, 1994; Gibson, 1996).
Unfortunately these terms have often been used loosely, with little precision. Lindsley et
al. (1994) do a good job in delineating between the terms. They define collective
efficacy as the group's collective belief that it can successfully perform a specific task.
Note, they assert that collective efficacy is task specific. In contrast, with group
aspiration level, group members urianimously agree on a specific performance target.
The aspirations are exact statements of performance goals rather than cognitive beliefs
about the group's capability to accomplish particular levels of performance.· Group
esteem is the extent to which individual's generally evaluate their social group
positively. It is a more global concept than task-specific collective efficacy, and refers to
the value of the group rather than the group's expected effectiveness in performing a
task. Group potency is a group's shared belief that it can be effective. It is a more
generalized belief in effectiveness than collective efficacy. Potency reflects a general
assessment of the likely effectiveness of the team across situations, whereas team
efficacy reflects shared performance expectations for a relatively specific situation.
Potency is meant to refer to a shared belief about general effectiveness across multiple
tasks encountered by groups in compiex environments.
This study is concerned with the construct of collective efficacy. Though not
always done in the literature, I wish to delineate between collective and group efficacy.
Mischel and Northcraft (1997) define the term collective efficacy as an individual's
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belief that his/her group or team can execute a task successfully. Individual beliefs are·
aggregated to determine collective efficacy. Gibson ( 1996) defines group efficacy as the
group's collective estimate (as a consensus) regarding the group's ability to perform a
task objective. I will follow their lead and use the terms in this manner.
There has been great debate over whether efficacy should be measured at the
individual or group level (Gibson, 1996). In other words, should individual member's
efficacy beliefs concerning the group be aggregated or should the group reach a
consensus on efficacy level? Some researchers assert that either method is fine because
both predict performance (Peterson et al, 1996; Guzzo et al., 1993). Others (Mischel &
Northcraft, 1997) urge adoption of the aggregate collection of individual beliefs
concerning group efficacy. The ratings are done individually and the referent is the
group. They prefer this method because individual beliefs drive and direct individual
effort and they assert that aggregation is a better predictor than consensus. Gibson
(1996) counters that consensus is a more appropriate method because it more accurately
reflects an attribute of the group, and group efficacy is a group level construct.
The danger in using the group efficacy consensus approach is the possibility of
the group arriving at a "politically correct" answer (Guzzo et al., 1993). In other words,
the group tendency to present a socially desirable answer in response to a set of demand
characteristics. The subject pool in this proposed study could be particularly prone to
these socially desirable answers. Air Force members are taught to present a confident air
and bravado. High goals are expected as reflected in the Air Force motto, "Aim High".
I feel that this may compromise the validity of a group efficacy measurement. An
anonymous individual collective efficacy estimate is one way to avoid this pitfalL
Furthermore. collective efficacy has been shown to be more predictive of performance
than group efficacy (Mischel & Northcraft. 1997). In light of these issues, collective
efficacy will be used in this research and the method of aggregation of individual
responses will be used to determine it.
In sum. collective efficacy gets at the task confidence of the group, while
transactive memory gets at the knowledge within the group. Collective efficacy is the
group's collective belief that it can successfully perform a specific task. Transactive
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memory is a system which combines the knowledge possessed by individual team
members with a shared awareness of who know what, who is good at what, and who
does what. These are clearly different constructs. However, it may be that high
transactive memory could contribute to higher collective efficacy. A team where
individuals realize who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what may feel
more confident about task accomplishment. This idea is alluded to by Mischel and
Northcraft ( 1997).
Collective Efficacy - Empirical Work
Collective efficacy research has demonstrated that collective efficacy exists as a
group attribute and that it predicts performance (Bandura, 1997). Collective efficacy has
been shown to be a predictor of performance in large organizations such as elementary
schools (Bandura, 1993). Staff member's collective efficacy concerning their ability to
motivate and educate students was strongly related to the school's academic
performance. The staffs collective efficacy was more important in predicting academic
performance than was the student body composition (socioeconomic status and racial
composition).
At the team level collective efficacy has also been shown to be an powerful
predictor of performance for both sports (Hodges and Carron, 1992) and work (Little &
Madigan, 1994) teams. Little and Madigan ( 1994) studied eight manufacturing teams of
twelve employees each over an 1$ month period. These were self-managed work teams
in a continuous manufacturing plant. Through surveys and structured interviews, it was
found that collective efficacy was highly correlated with mean performance ratings made
· by independent line leaders.
These studies have clearly demonstrated a collective efficacy - performance
linkage. Others (Knight, Durham, Locke, 1996; Gibson, 1996) have examined possible
mediators or moderators of this relationship. One of more established constructs in the
prediction of performance is goal setting. Knight et al. ( 1996) studied the relationship of
goal setting, strategic risk, and collective efficacy (they use the term team efficacy) using
88 3-person teams in a computer tank simulation. Controlling for ability, teams with
higher collective efficacy chose harder goals, which led to riskier strategies and higher
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performance. Goals set by the team were strongly influenced by collective efficacy. So
it seems that collective efficacy may translate into higher performance through higher set
team goals. In addition, performance feedback is an important component of goal
setting. Prussia and Kinicki ( 1996) demonstrated that the impact of performance
feedback on group brainstorming performance operated entirely through its effect on
collective efficacy and affective reactions.
Gibson ( 1996) cleverly examined cultural differences in the collective efficacy performance relationship by studying U.S. and Indonesian nursing teams and simulations
using U.S. and Hong Kong management teams. Gibson found that task interdependence,
collectivism and differentiation (how we seek for information - either self-reliance or
looking to others) moderate the collective efficacy - performance relationship. When
task interdependence is high, higher collective efficacy was related to higher
performance. This relationship disappeared under conditions of low task
interdependence (where the task does not require teamwork). Collective efficacy seems
to be more effective for those high in collectivism. Furthermore, for those that tend to
look to others for information, higher collective efficacy led to higher performance.
Whereas, for those that look to self for information, higher collective efficacy led to
lower performance. Gibson was the first to show that under certain conditions higher
collective efficacy can actually lead to lower performance. She hypothesizes that this
occurs when the team high in collective efficacy refuses to look to others for
information.
Perhaps the study which is most germane to the work presented here was
conducted by Lindsley et al. (1994). They had 54 two-member teams complete a series
of six preprogrammed ten-minute missions on a PC-based combat jet simulator.
Collective efficacy and potency were assessed using survey measures along with
objective indices of team task performance. They found that collective efficacy and
potency (a more global confidence score as described earlier) were distinguishable
constructs and that performance related more significantly with efficacy than potency.
Collective efficacy was found to have a significant positive influence on performance
development. Additionally, performance related significantly to subsequent collective
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efficacy levels.
In sum, empirical research has supported the idea that collective efficacy predicts
performance (Bandura, 1997, 1993; Little & Madigan, 1994; Hodges & Carron, 1992;
Lindsley et al. 1994). Under certain conditions, goal setting may mediate the collective
efficacy -performance relationship. Additionally, cultural factors such as collectivism
can moderate the relationship. Collective efficacy predicts performance, but is also
effected by previous performance (Lindsley et al., 1994) and performance feedback
(Prussia & Kinicki, 1996)

The Relationship of Transactive memory and Collective efficacy.
What is the potential relationship between transactive memory, collective
efficacy, and performance? One potential link is that collective efficacy may lead to
transactive memory. This seems to be what Peterson et al. ( 1996) found in their work on
collective efficacy and shared mental models. Early group efficacy led to a higher level
of mental models later in the quarter which in tum predicted group performance.
Though not exactly the same construct as transactive memory, Peterson et al.'s (1996)
measurement of mental models shared many similar characteristics with transactive
memory. Specifically the group's shared mental models focused on items like "who
knows what" and "who does what". Peterson et al.'. s ( 1996) teams had no previous
history with one another before the beginning of the study (i.e. the academic quarter) and
little history before the first measurement of efficacy and mental models. It seems
unlikely that a team with little or no prior history could have developed mental models
(or transactive memory), which would predict collective efficacy later in the quarter.
More likely it seems that transactive memory and other factors lead to collective
efficacy. First, intuitively we suspect that experience and ability lead to greater collective
efficacy. Theoretically, Mischel and Northcraft (1997) assert that there are two
components of collective efficacy: 1) Collective Task Efficacy and 2) Collective
Interdependence efficacy. Collective task efficacy is the team member's estimation of
whether they have the KSAs necessary to perform the task. Certainly, if a group does
not feel they have the ability and experience necessary to provide the KSAs for the task,
collective efficacy would suffer. The Air Force focuses a great deal of effort and
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attention on proper flight training. Anecdotally, the airline industry prefers to hire exmilitary aviators, primarily due to their outstanding training, experience, and discipline.
It would seem clear that most aircrew teams would feel that they have the necessary

KSAs to perform the task (i.e. collective task efficacy). Mischel and Northcraft's second
component, Collective Interdependence efficacy, concerns the issue of the team
possessing the KSAs necessary to work together to accomplish the task. Though not as
concentrated as the aviation skills training, the Air Force has established a program
(referred to as Crew Resource Management or CRM) in order to provide aircrews' with
the KSAs necessary to work effectively as a team.
The seeds of collective efficacy lie in Bandura's (1982) work on self-efficacy. It
is reasonable to assume that many principles of self efficacy translate directly to the
group level as Bandura (1997) asserts. Bandura asserts that four categories of experience
help to develop self efficacy. The primary and most important is what Bandura refers to
as enactive mastery. Enactive mastery consists of previous personal attainments. It is
clear that experience and ability are an integral part of those previous personal
attainments.
Enactive mastery and other categories of experience provide informational cues
for the three types of assessment processes used to form self efficacy (Gist and Mitchell,
1992). One of the assessments involved is the assessment of personal (or team) and
situational resources/constraints. Again, assuming self efficacy processes operate at the
group level. the team assesses whether they have the resources (including the KSAs)
necessary to successfully complete the task in view of the constraints of the situation. A
team that is lacking the necessary abilities and experience is unlikely to have a positive
assessment of their resources and, therefore, will likely have a lower state of collective
efficacy. In sum, it seems that experience and ability have an important theoretical role
in the dewlopment of collective efficacy.
What other theoretical processes help to develop collective efficacy besides
ability and experience? It appears that a well developed transactive memory system will
provide a solid basis for formation of high collective efficacy. A case may be made for
this assertion. using the theoretical approaches just touched upon.
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Transactive memory is a knowledge system of who knows what, who does what,
and who is good at what. This knowledge system would be very helpful in assessing
Mischel and Northcraft's (1997) two components of collective efficacy. Does the team
have the KSAs to perform the task (collective task efficacy) and more importantly does
the team possess the KSAs to work together effectively (interdependence efficacy)?
Being aware of who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what would allow
team members to more confidently assess these two components.
Furthermore, it would seem that a higher level of transactive memory would
allow the team to have a better sense of Bandura's (1982) enactive mastery. A team that
has been together, worked together, and thus developed a transactive memory system
should have more enactive mastery to draw upon.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a well developed system of transactive
memory would greatly enhance a team's ability to assess team and situational
resources/constraints. A team that has been together and worked on a task together in
the past; would have a more accurate gauge with which to judge team and situational
resources/constraints. Transactive memory should be invaluable in this respect. If these
arguments hold true, there should be a high relationship between transactive memory and
collective efficacy.
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Chapter 3
Research Model and Hypotheses
Given the above literature review, I now propose an overall theoretical model
which will serve as the impetus for the hypotheses. Figure 1 depicts the model. The
model is to be tested on both nominal and actual teams with clearly defined roles. The
teams will be composed of two or more members. The relationships depicted should be
evident in both the lab and the field.

Turnover in training
Time in the organization 7

Transactive memory

71

Turnover in composition

Performance
Collective efficacy

71

1'
Experience and Ability
Figure 1. Transactive memory and collective efficacy; dual influences on performance.

The model depicts how two types of Process variables (Campion et al., 1996) can
influence team performance. The first is a systems/network variable, transactive
memory. Important inputs that influence the development of transactive memory are
shown. Turnover in team training and/or team composition should negatively influence
the development of transactive memory. Additionally, time in an organization should
enhance the development of transactive memory systems. Transactive memory in tum
should positively influence team performance. The second Process variable is a
motivational one, collective efficacy. Experience and ability are important inp~ts into
collective efficacy, as well as team performance. Collective efficacy and transactive
memory are both thought to positively influence team performance.
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The specific background for the particular studies conducted in this current
dissertation come from the work of Moreland et al. ( 1998). These scholars call for
additional research on natural work groups to confirm laboratory transactive memory
findings. They suggest that research on natural work groups might involve archival or
field studies and could be experimental or correlational in form. Information on
transactive memory systems could be obtained through self-report or observational data
and those data could then be correlated with various measures of group performance.
They go on to suggest that particularly fruitful work may be done in organizations that
vary in group training techniques by examining what effects these differences have on
transactive memory systems and group performance.
The present studies are patterned after many of Moreland et al.' s ( 1998)
suggestions. The present studies seek to extend empirical transactive memory research
into several unexplored areas. This exploration should in tum either support or question
the theoretical work to date. Thus far, theoretical work has exceeded empirical work.
Furthermore. the influence of transactive memory will be compared to the more
established construct of collective efficacy in an attempt to set up competing models to
explain team performance. The model in Figure 1 suggests that both transactive memory
and collective efficacy will influence performance separately. Results will shed light on
which of the two constructs is the most powerful predictor. In order to e:x.tend Moreland
et al.' s ( 1998) empirical work, the following hypothesis will be tested.

Hypothesis 1: Teams with higher levels of transactive memory will outperform teams
with lower levels of transactive memory.

A number of team characteristics have not been examine.ct in relation to
transactive memory. These characteristics were touched upon in the beginning of this
chapter. One issue to be addressed is the degree to which transactive memory systems
have an effect on performance when roles are more clearly defined. In all of the studies
using the AM radio assembly task. roles were left undefined by the experimenters. Each
group defined its own roles during assembly. Only one transactive memory study has
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attempted to address anything related to tearri roles. Wegner et al. (1991) imposed a
structure (by assigning expertise) as one of their experimental conditions. In this case,
the imposed structure harmed performance in natural couples who already had an
established expertise structure in place. The imposed structure improved performance in
impromptu couples, but not significantly. Imposing structure on the team (by assigning
expertise) could be viewed as defined roles. It would seem that well defined roles would
lessen the need for a mature transactive memory system. If a transactive memory system
is "who knows what, who is good at what, and who does what" then roles answer these
questions to a degree. For example in a police SWAT team, the sniper is the one who
knows about long range shooting, he is the one who is good at long range shooting, and
he does the long range shooting. However, even with well defined positions, certain
tasks may not be "position specific". Returning to the SWAT team, one of several
officers may be the expert in weapon maintenance.
Do transactive memory systems operate in teams of greater than three
individuals? It seems clear that teams of two and three do develop such systems. It
would seem logical that with increased group membership size, the importance of
transactive memory would increase as well. As more members are added it may be
harder to determine "who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what". On
the other hand, there is much more information available to the group by the sheer
presence of more disparate minds. It would be helpful to identify expertise so that
information could be smoothly funneled to the expert. The greater numbers also bring a
greater challenge to group coordination and cohesion. Well developed transactive
memory systems should improve these areas. It would also seem to take greater time
and effort to build such systems with larger membership. Finally, task credibility (i.e.
recognizing expertise and not challenging others) may be harder to obtain with larger
teams. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested.

Hypothesis 2: In teams of greater than three individuals, transactive memory will affect
performance in a positive manner.
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Do transactive memory systems operate outside the laboratory, for instance in the
field or in simulations? It would seem that they do. Wegner's (1987, 1991) natural
couples developed their transactive memory system outside of the laboratory and it was
simply tested inside the lab. However, Moreland et al.'s (1998) radio groups were all
undergraduates and the groups were nominal. Tests of actual teams in the field are
needed.

Hypothesis 3: Transactive memory effects found in laboratory groups, will be present
outside the laboratory.

A number of variables should influence the development of transactive memory
in the team (see Figure 1). Will consistent turnover or the reconstituting of teams cripple
transactive memory and in tum lower performance? It seems likely, especially if
transactive memory systems take time to develop as Wegner ( 1987) hypothesized.
Moreland et al. ( 1996) demonstrated that teams that experienced turnover after training
did not perform as well as teams that were trained and tested together. It also is
conceivable that time in an organization may be related to the development of transactive
memory. The longer an individual has been in an organization, the greater the
opportunities to know other's strengths and weaknesses. This greater knowledge of
other organizational members should translate into higher transactive memory levels
among the teams, even if these teams are consistently reconstituted.

Hypothesis 4: Turnover, via the reconstitution of teams, will negatively affect
transactive memory and performance in tum.

Hypothesis 5: Teams trained together will foster development of transactive memory
systems which will result in increased performance over others trained in separate teams.

Hypothesis 6: Interaction over time in an organization should increase the level of
transactive memory among teams.
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Finally, collective efficacy has been shown to be a predictor of piloting
performance in the laboratory (Lindsley et al. 1994). By extension it seems that
collective efficacy should also predict flight performance in the air (see Fig. 1). Mischel
and Northcraft (1997) have hypothesized that a portion of an individual's collective
efficacy estimate is a determination of the KSAs of the group members in both task
knowledge and interpersonal group skills. This is related to the idea of transactive
memory (who knows what, who does what, who is good at what). However, as seen
earlier, transactive memory consists of more than knowledge of interpersonal and task
skills. As pictured in Figure 1, transactive memory and collective efficacy are both
hypothesized to influence performance. Based on the previous discussion, the following
hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis 7: Collective efficacy will be a predictor of flight crew performance.
Hypothesis 8: Transactive memory will explain variance in flight crew performance,
above and beyond that of collective efficacy.
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Chapter 4
Study 1: Flight Simulation

Methods
Overview
Study 1 was a flight simulation using a pilot and advisor team. The pilot flew a
PC based simulator mission with the aid of the advisor in an effort to engage and destroy
enemy aircraft. Transactive memory was examined through an experimental design that
manipulated the composition of the pilot/advisor teams. More specifically, in one
condition the pilots had the same advisor during their second set of trials while in the
other condition the advisor for the second set of trials was new. This study tests
Hypothesis 1, that teams with higher levels of transactive memory will outperform teams
with lower levels of transactive memory.

Subjects
Subjects for this study were eight current or former military fighter pilots or
Weapons Systems Operators from the local area. Each subject had been a rated military
fighter aviator with at least 1,250 hours of military jet fighter time. An earlier pilot study
indicated that actual military pilots \Vere required to realistically complete the task. Due
to the rigorous participation criteria. only eight aviators could be recruited. Subjects
participated on a volunteer basis and all were males. Irt all, the subjects possessed over
18,550 hours in fighter aircraft. Seven of the eight had actual combat time in either
Vietnam or the Persian Gulf. Table 1 summarizes the subjects' experience in particular
aircraft. Each box indicates a type of aircraft, the number of individuals who flew that
aircraft and the total hours in that aircraft. Several subjects had time in multiple aircraft,
so the total does not sum to eight. The subject pool was very impressive· and provides
excellent external validity.
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T able 1. Sub"11ect s expenence m vanous fi1gh ter airerafit.
F-4
F-15
F-5
3@ 3875

3@ 2810

1 @200

A-4

F-14

F-18

2@ 1325

2@ 2300

1@ 1000

F-105

F-111

A-10

1 @750

1@ 1300

1 @ 1400

(number of subjects

@

total hours)

Design
This study was a 2X2X2 mixed factor design. The first factor was Advisor
(Same/ Different) which was a between subject factor. The second factor was Week
(One/ Two) which was a within subject factor. The third factor was Technical (Tech)
Condition (High/ Low), also a within subject factor. The Tech condition was created for
an alternative research project. Under the Tech condition, the advisor's access to the
pilot was manipulated. In the High Tech condition, the advisor was seated next to the
pilot with visual access to the pilot and the pilot's displays. In the Low Tech condition, a
curtain separated the advisor and the pilot, restricting visual access between the two.
The primary factor of interest for this study was Advisor (Same/ Different)
during Week 2. It is in this condition that transactive memory was manipulated. During
Week 2 the pilot either worked with the same advisor he had trained with during Week 1
(transactive memory condition) or a different advisor (no transactive memory condition).
Therefore, only the results of the Week 2 Advisor manipulation will be reported with one
exception. When there was a significant interaction with one of the other factors, then
that interaction will be reported.
Pilots flew an F-22 PC based simulator on a simulated combat mission. They
were assisted by one of two advisors who helped them navigate, evade enemy threats,
and engage and destroy hostile aircraft. Pilots were trained by the advisor during the first
week and then performed two actual trials. One of the trials was in the High Tech
condition where the advisor had greater visual access to the pilot and the pilot's
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information and view. The other trial was in the Low Tech condition where the
advisor's view of the pilot was restricted, as was information about the pilot's situation.
The pilots returned one week later. They worked with either the Same Advisor as Week
1 or a Different Advisor. They received a short refresher session on the simulation and
then performed two criteria trials, High and Low Tech. Tech condition was
counterbalanced.
Procedure and Task

Advisors were trained over several weeks on the characteristics of the PC based
simulator, the simulation, and the specific mission to be accomplished. Training ensured
that both advisors were equal in ability.
When pilots arrived they were greeted by the experimenter. They received a
short introduction to the task and then were introduced to the advisor. The advisor then
took them to the simulator and conducted a training session with the pilot using a three
page checklist (see Appendix A). The training session covered the mechanics of the
control inputs, the symbology of the simulator displays, and the handling characteristics
of the simulator. The pilot was then instructed on weapons use, evading threats,
employing wingmen, and finding targets. The training session concluded with a criterion
trial. In the criterion trial the pilot had to successfully down three enemy aircraft without
being shot-down. Once criterion was reached, the actual trials began. Introduction,
training, and criterion trials required approximately 45 to 50 minutes to complete.
The actual mission consisted of a simulated Combat Air Patrol (CAP) mission
over Bosnia. These were routine missions where friendly fighter aircraft orbit and wait
for enemy aircraft to come across a designated line. Once enemy aircraft were detected
they were to be engaged and destroyed. The simulation began with the pilot in the air
over Italy. The simulation was then "fast forwarded" as the pilot was taken across the
Adriatic Sea to Bosnia. Just before leaving the Adriatic Sea airspace, the simulator was
frozen and the actual trial began. The advisor aided the pilot in navigating the aircraft,
identify enemy targets, engaging the enemy, avoiding air to air and ground threats, and
employing weapons. The advisor's role was a cross between the role of an onboard
Weapons System Operator in older fighter aircraft and an Airborne Warning and
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Command System (AWACS) advisor who is responsible for directing friendly air forces

in a coordinated manner against threats. The Air Force is currently investigating ways to
make the AW ACS advisor more helpful and this study was conducted in conjunction
with that investigation.
The pilot and advisor had access to similar information, however, only the
advisor could view situations more than 25 miles from the pilot's aircraft. In the High
Tech condition the advisor had a much better idea of what was actually occurring in the
"cockpit" of the pilot.
Every three minutes an alarm sounded and the simulator was frozen. Displays
were then covered and both pilot and advisor filled out questionnaires on situational
awareness measures (see Appendix B) and their perception of the value of
communication between themselves (Appendix C). The advisor, using information from
the displays, immediately graded only answers to the situational awareness questions.
Once those questions had been graded, the simulation was continued. Pilots were not
advised of their performance on the situational awareness measures. Questionnaires
were completed four times for both the High and Low Tech trials. The actual mission
portion lasted for 12 minutes for both the High and Low Tech conditions unless the
aircraft was shot down or crashed (at which time that trial terminated). At the end of the
trial, several performance measures were recorded by the advisor on the front of the
Situational Awareness questionnaires (see Appendix D). Sessions were videotaped for
later analysis of behavioral transactive memory indices (see Appendix E).
The Week 2 trials were identical to Week 1 with few exceptions. The advisor
either remained the same as the first week (Same) or was replaced by the second advisor
(Different). Instead of an extensive training period, pilots were given a quick (10
minute) review session of the symbology, switchology, control inputs, utilization of
wingmen, and_ a short practice dogfight. Performance measures, situational awareness
measures, and videotape all remained the same.
Measures

Performance. The simulation computed several performance measures for each
mission and printed it out following the mission. The result was a categorical summary
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(five categories from Poor to Outstanding) computed by the simulator using the other
performance measures. Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) was a measure of weapon
employment (100% reflects total accuracy with all weapons). Effectiveness considered
targets destroyed as well as friendly losses (0-100%). Mission duration was calculated
from the time the simulator came off of freeze, until the final Situational Awareness
buzzer sounded (a maximum of 12 minutes). Number of aircraft shotdown was selfexplanatory. How Ended was a dichotomous variable, either flew away (2) or shot
down/crashed (1).
Situational Awareness. Situational awareness (SA) of both the pilot and advisor
was measured using the form shown in Appendix B. This form was based on the
SAGAT (Situational Awareness Global Assessment Technique) used to assess military

pilot's SA (Endsley, 1995). The items addressed location of wingmen, location of
bogeys (i.e. enemy aircraft), aircraft information (e.g. aircraft attitude), and number, type,
and result of weapons fired. All this information is important to combat success.
Situational Awareness was a percentage score. A score of 1.0 indicated completely
accurate SA answers.
Perception of Communication. The value of communication between pilot and
advisor was assessed on this questionnaire (see Appendix C) deveioped at the Human
Interface Technology (HIT) Laboratory at the University of Washington with the help of
the Investigator.
Behavioral Analysis. Videotapes were made of both Week 1 and Week 2
sessions. A trained observer from the Speech Communications Department, who was
blind to the experiment, later analyzed the videotapes for the three behavioral indices of
transactive memory (memory differentiation, task coordination, and task credibility).
Additionally, the Investigator also analyzed the tapes using the same rating forms (see
Appendix E). Ratings between observers were compared and revealed a high correlation
(r = .972). Therefore, both observer's ratings were combined for statistical analyses.
Only ratings of Week 2 were used in the analyses. Videotape rating training to ensure
consistency between raters, was conducted with Week 1 tapes. Week 2 tapes were the
actual tapes coded for transactive memory.
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The rating form (see Appendix E) was an expanded version of the form used by
Liang et al. ( 1995) in their behavioral coding. The rating form consisted of nine scales
designed to evaluate the three components of Transactive Memory as defined by
Moreland and colleagues (1998). Eight of the scales were 7 point lickert scales with a
neutral middle position. The final measure was a behavioral count of incidences of
confusion between the pilot and the advisor. The three components of TM and the
measures are listed in Figure 2.

Memory Differentiation

.Task Coordination

Task Credibility

Remember Different Elements
Responsibility for Different tasks

Task Coordination
Confusion (count)
Smoothness of Commun.
Level of Cooperation

Level of Criticism
Level of Frustration
Accept Suggestions

Figure 2. Chart of Behavioral Analysis Items for Transactive Memory Videotape Rating
Form.

Results
Determination of Significance. The individual sample size (n=8) of Study 1 was
small. Furthermore, when dealing with group level phenomenon it is difficult to reach
the "classic" alpha significance level of .05. With these considerations in mind, an alpha
significance level of .10 was chosen as a reasonable level (Cascio & Zedeck, 1983). All
p values reported will be one-tailed unless noted otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics. A visual inspection of the data was conducted. Two of the
performance dependent measures (Result and BDA) resulted in very high performance
with little variance. This is likely due to the high abilities of the subjects. No other
departures from normality were noted.
Equivalence of Advisors. Advisors worked closely together during training in
order to ensure equivalent ability and techniques. Analyses of the first week's
performance data indicated no difference between advisors' performance with pilots.
Hypothesis l. Hypothesis 1 asserts that higher performance will be attained by
pilots in the transactive memory condition (same advisor both weeks). Study 1
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endeavored to measure performance through a variety of means; each of these measures
will be covered in tum.
Pilot Performance. It was hypothesized that pilots working with the same advisor
in both Weeks 1 and 2 (Same Ad, T.M. condition) would show higher performance than
those changing advisors on Week 2 (Different Ad, no T.M. condition). Only Week 2 is
of interest for this transactive memory analysis as that is where the advisor change
occurred (see Table 2). A MANOV A was performed on five of the dependent variables
(the dichotomous variable was excluded to satisfy MANOVA requirements). The
MANOV A for the performance data indicates that the advisor condition does not
significantly effect the performance of the pilot in the second week (Wilks' lamba p =
.289). The two groups do not differ across the vector of DV s.

Table 2. Performance Data b Transactive memo Condition
Same Advisor (T.M.) Different Advisor (no T.M.)
Duration of Fli ht
11.00 ·
9.64
# Aircraft shot down
2.75
3.38
Bomb Dama e Assess.
83.93
90.36
Mission Effectiveness
90.00
85.88
Downed 1 or Flew Awa 2
1.75
1.62
4.88
4.13

The majority of the dependent measures were in the hypothesized direction (five·
of the six). However, none of the dependent measures reached statistical significance.
This is likely attributable to the small sample size (n = 8).
Situational Awareness. The transactive memory analyses revealed that when the
advisor was changed for Week 2, that situational awareness on the part of the pilot was
decreased (see Table 3). This is likely due to the fact that the advisor was not familiar
with what type of information that the particular pilot required to build high SA. The
Same Advisor pilots had higher SA than the Different Advisor pilots (p = .028).
Furthermore. the Same Advisor Condition in period 3 also resulted in higher SA (p =
.037), however. measures from this period should be taken with caution. Debriefs with
the pilots after the simulator mission -revealed that they were periodically taken into

-----------------------------------------·-----~-------
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scenarios under which they would not have entered under actual combat conditions.
These "furballs" often occurred when several enemy aircraft engaged the pilot while he
was near a surface to air missile (SAM) site. The pilots reported that they normally
would have egressed (exited) the situation, but were not given this option in our
simulation. These scenarios (or "furballs") occurred only during periods 2 and 3 when
the fighting was at its most intense. Furthermore, the values for periods 3 and 4 suffer
from a smaller sample size as there are no values for pilots shot down in previous
periods.

Table 3. Situational Awareness b Transactive memo Condition for Pilots
Different Advisor
Same Advisor
.62**
Overall SA
.75**
.74
.73
SA
.40
SA
.62
SA
.85**
.61**
.81
.60
**p < .05
The situational awareness of the advisor was also examined. Just as from the
Pilot's perspective, we see that a change· in advisor - pilot pairings also adversely
affected the advisor's SA (see Table 4). When the advisor- pilot paring was changed,
the advisor's SA decreased (p = .039). There are similar results for periods 2 (p = .096)
and period 4 (p = .073). It is suspected that the pairs were not as cognizant of the
information that the other member required to build high levels of SA.
Table 4. Situational Awareness b Transactive memo
Same Advisor
.92**
.94
.88*
.85
.95*
**p < .05; *p < .10

Condition for Advisors
Different Advisor
.77**
.89
.69*
.72
.73*

...----------------------------------~----------

41
Perceptual Data. Reliabilities for the perceptual scales were assessed. For the
pilots' ratings a= .76, and for the advisors' ratings a= .89. The perceptual (or
subjective) ratings made by both the pilot and advisor at the end of each flying period
revealed few significant differences. A MANOV A was performed on the seven
dependent variables for the pilot's ratings. The MANOVA for the perceptual data
indicates that the advisor condition (same of different) does not significantly effect the
perceptual ratings of the pilot in the second week (Wilks' lamba p = .935). The two
groups do not differ across the vector of DVs. However when the ratings are examined
individually there are indications that there may be some underlying differences. From
the pilot's perspective, when the advisor changed, all subjective ratings dropped or
stayed the same. Only the pilot's rating of the advisor's performance approached
significance (p = .116). When the advisor changed, the pilot tended to rate the advisor's
performance lower.
Things were a bit stronger from the advisor's perspective (see Table 5). All
ratings made by the advisor were lower when the advisor was working with a new pilot
(Different Ad) in Week 2. The advisor rated his own performance lower when working
with a new pilot (p=.053) and the advisor rated the new pilot's performance lower as
well (p= .092). Interestingly, the advisor's confidence in the correctness of his ratings of
the pilot's SA drops when working with a new pilot (p= .074)
T abl e 5 . Perceptual Data from the Advisor's perspective
Different Advisor
Same Advisor
(T.M.)
(no T.M.)
Amt of Communication
.75
.72
Value of Communication
.81
.80
Instigator of
.86
.85
Communication
Advisor's Performance
*.87
* .81
Pilot's Performance
*.89
*.82
Other's SA
.85
.79
Confidence in Ratin2
*.81
*.65
*p < .10
Measure
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Behavioral Analysis. Reliabilities for the sub-scales were assessed. For the
Memory Differentiation items a= .11, for the Task Coordination items a= .63, and for
the Task Credibility items a = .51 . The Memory Differentiation component is
particularly low. This may be due to hierarchical roles as discussed later. The Memory
Differentiation Component of transactive memory revealed no significant differences.
This was surprising as the series of studies by Moreland and colleagues (1998)
consistently showed a difference between teams that stayed together versus teams that
were reconstituted.
Analyses of the Task Coordination Component of transactive memory revealed
some surprising trends. Generally, the Different Advisor Condition resulted in smoother
task coordination, less confusion, and more effective sequencing of communication. In a
nutshell, it seems that the Different Advisor Condition resulted· in better communication
between pilot and advisor.
Specifics of the Task Coordination Component are below (see Table 6). There
was a significant interaction between Tech and Advisor in relationship to Confusion.
This interaction is seen in Figure 3. High Tech seems to mitigate increased confusion in
the Different Advisor condition, but not in the Same Advisor Condition. Perhaps there
is an increased vigilance when working in the Different Advisor condition which would
explain this interaction (see Fig. 3). Interaction aside, Same Advisor showed
significantly more incidences of confusion than did the Different Advisor Condition.
Different Advisor also showed higher task coordination and smoother sequencing of
communication.
Table 6. Task Coordination Com onent b Transactive memo Condition
Same Advisor
Different Advisor
Amt of Confusion
4.50***
1.50***
------!
Task Coordination
6.25*
6.69*
------f
Se...._
uence
Communication -+-----------+----5.56***
6.31 ***
__
_________
Coo eration
6.50
6.50
~----~------_.__
_.__
***p<.01: *p<.10

_________ ____
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Figure 3. Interaction of Tech and Advisor Condition for the Confusion Variable

There were no specific trends noted in the Task Credibility Component of
transactive memory. It is likely that the computer simulation of combat was unable to
induce any differences in Frustration, Criticism, or Accepting Suggestions that could
result in an actual flight under hostile flying conditions.
In summary of the Behavioral Analysis. the assignment of roles may affect the
Memory Differentiation Component of transactive memory. The increased arousal of
working with a new Advisor/Pilot may have led to increased emphasis on
communication between the two. This communication was not able to overcome the
advantages of working in the same teams that was evident under the Performance and
Situational Awareness measures. Finally, it is unlikely that a simulation can induce
increased levels of criticism, frustration, and resistance to suggestions (especially with
clearly delineated roles) due to the more powerful effects of such things as Social
Desirability (e.g. pilot and advisor maintaining a cordial relationship).
Taken as a whole these results provide only partial support for Hypotheses 1.
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Discussion of Study 1
It seems that when Advisor/ Pilot teams are kept in tact (the transactive memory
condition), performance measures have a tendency to be higher. Larger sample sizes are
required to confirm this trend. Both pilots and advisors showed higher SA when they
remained in their set team. Interestingly, when the Advisor / Pilot team is changed, the
advisor rates both the pilot's and the advisor's (his own) performance as lower. Perhaps
this is a reflection of a perceived increase in difficulty in working with a new pilot on the
part of the advisor. Finally, video behavioral analyses indicate that memory
differentiation and responsibility may become overlapped in a situation where team
members are assigned roles that encompass a teacher/pupil relationship. It also seems
that new teams put more effort into smoothly communicating and coordinating with one
another in an effort to effectively work with the new team member.
Surprisingly, the Memory Differentiation component of transactive memory
revealed no significant differences in this study. One explanation for the lack of
significance is the fact that team members were assigned clear roles in this study. In
Moreland's studies team members were never assigned roles, rather roles emerged as
persons with specialized knowledge migrated towards certain positions. Furthermore, in
this study there was almost a hierarchical relationship between the two positions. The
advisor not only assisted the pilot, but also trained the pilot in the use of the simulator
(e.g. use of controls, symbology, etc.). These roles may have dictated that both pilot and
advisor would maintain similar types of information. It also may have led to an overlap
in responsibility for the tasks dictated by the scenario. This idea that assigned roles may
be a boundary condition for the Memory Differentiation Component requires further
research.
The Different Advisor Condition (the no transactive memory condition) produced
significantly higher results for the Task Coordination Component of Transactive
memory. These results were not expected, rather the Same Advisor Condition was
hypothesized to result in better task coordination. It seems likely that a change in
advisors resulted in greater arousal on the part of the pilot and the advisor. When the
advisor changed it may have caused both the pilot and the advisor to put more effort into
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their communication since they were unfamiliar with one another. Conversely, perhaps
the same advisor and pilot teams took more of a "laissez faire" attitude ("ok, same ole,
same ole, same mission, same advisor") as little had changed from the first week's
mission. In the Same Advisor condition, advisors and pilots were familiar with one
another and perhaps not as vigilant in their communication patterns. This would explain
less effective levels of communication, but yet an increase in performance and SA
measures.
The greatest strength and weakness of this study are both related to the sample.
The sample size was extremely small. This made it difficult to find any significant
differences in the results. However, there were some significant differences in
performance indicating the robust value of transactive memory in teams. Taken as a
whole, several trends were clear even with the small sample size.
The reason for the small sample size was the extremely high criteria for
participation in the study. The vast majority of studies to date have used college students
as subjects. The use of combat jet pilots increases the generalizability of these findings
outside of the lab into the cockpit. Subjects were professional and expert in the flying
task. Earlier pilot studies of this research indicated that novices were not able to
accomplish the task of combating enemy aircraft due to their inability to fly the
simulator, operate the weaponry, and performing the combat maneuvers required to
defeat the enemy. Anecdotally, several of the participants commented on the high
fidelity and realism of the simulator.
Study l was one of the most realistic lab tests of transactive memory to date.
However, field testing is required in transactive memory research. No field tests of
transactive memory have appeared in the literature. Furthermore, Wegner et al. (1991)
employed natural teams in their sample and Hollingshead ( 1998) recently surveyed
employees at the University of Illinois on their natural office staff teams. However, in
the lab portion of her study, Hollingshead used nominal teams. In short, there have been
few tests of transactive memory using natural teams and no tests in field settings. Study
2 and 3 provide field tests of transactive memory and collective efficacy on actual Air
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Force aircrews in the KC-135. These are important tests examining the question: is
transactive memory a construct strictly for the lab, or is it important in the real world?
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Chapter 5
Study 2: Fairchild AFB

Methods
Overview
Study 2 was a field study using Air Force flight teams at Fairchild AFB. Crew
levels of transactive memory and collective efficacy were collected prior to an
operational aircraft check flight. The flight was graded by independent evaluators to
provide performance measures.

Subjects and Setting
Subjects were actual Air Force KC-135 aircrews stationed at Fairchild AFB in
Spokane, Washington. Fairchild is the largest KC-135 base in the world. The Boeing
KC-135 Stratotanker is used for aerial refueling and to transport cargo. The aircraft is .
based on the Boeing 707 airframe. There are four crewmembers on board the aircraft.
The Aircraft Commander (AC) is the senior pilot on board and is the final authority for
aircrew decisions. The AC generally has at least three years of experience in the aircraft
and has flown for a minimum of four years. The Copilot (Co) is the second pilot on
board. The Copilot assists the AC in piloting the aircraft. He or she has access to
identical controls and nearly all the same switches and instruments available to the AC.
The experience range of a Copilot varies between several months to three years. The
Navigator (Nav) is seated behind the pilots and is responsible for navigating the aircraft
using both electronic and celestial equipment. The navigator also assumes some
communication duties and generally is responsible for any classified material aboard the
aircraft. The experience range of a navigator can vary from a couple of months to over
ten years. The KC-135 is beginning to undergo modifications in order to replace the
Navigator with updated electronic equipment to be managed by the pilots.
The Boom Operator (Boom) is the only non-commissioned officer aboard the
aircraft. The Boom is responsible for operating the boom apparatus in order to refuel
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other aircraft from the KC-135. The Boom is also responsible for handling the cargo and
dealing with any passengers on board. Boom Operators vary in experience from several
months to over twenty years. In summary, the KC-135 aircrew is composed of an
Aircraft Commander, Copilot, Navigator, and Boom. Operator.
A total of 87 crewmembers participated. However, 12 of those individuals were
involved with flights with no checkrides (and thus no performance scores) and were
therefore dropped from the sample. Another two individuals responded to the survey,
but the other two crewmembers on board did not and therefore, the crew surveys were
unusable. This resulted in a sample of 73 (of a possible 7 6) individuals and a total of 19
aircrews. Of the three missing surveys, one individual failed to respond to the survey.
One individual (from a Day 1 flight; crew surveyed on Day 2, see below) was dispatched
from the base before they could be surveyed and one individual was assigned to the
evaluation team, but acting as a crewmember on a flight, and therefore was asked not to
fill out a survey. Twenty crews were evaluated during the inspection. Usable surveys
were returned by nineteen of the crews for a response rate of 95%. Subjects served on a
volunteer basis. There were 66 males and 7 females. Experience in the KC-135 ranged
from several months to over 20 years.
Procedure and Task
Air Force crews are subject to a major inspection (known as ASEV, or Aircrew
Standardization Evaluation Visit) once every two years. During this visit, 25% of the
crews on base are planned to be evaluated by Headquarters personnel for flying
efficiency and effectiveness during an operational checkride flight. A checkride is a
flight where one or more of the crewmembers is evaluated by an experienced check
crewmember in order to determine the readiness and proficiency of the evaluatee and
crew.
During mission planning the day prior, or the morning of the checkride, the
experimenter administered crews a questionnaire to assess transactive memory and
collective efficacy. (see Appendix F). Each crew received a survey for each of the four
crewmembers. Prior to the flight, the crews dropped completed surveys into a
designated box in the mission planning room of Base Operations. At the end of the day
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the experimenter retrieved the surveys which were sealed in an envelope. Two of the
crews, which were evaluated during day one of the evaluation, received their surveys
after the flight. It was not possible to administer their surveys prior to the flight.
After the checkride was complete, the evaluator completed a questionnaire
concerning the aircrew's performance on the checkride. This questionnaire focused on
overall aircrew performance (see Appendix G). Both questionnaires were accompanied
by a cover letter (see Appendix H).
Measures

Collective Efficacy. Collective efficacy was measured using questions 44, 47,
49, and 50 of the aircrew questionnaire (see Appendix F). Question 44 was adapted
from Peterson et al.' s ( 1996) measure of team efficacy. Following the suggestion of
Mischel and Northcraft (1997), the efficacy questions refer to both task skills and
knowledge. Items 47 and 49 were used by Lindsley et al. (1994) in their study of
collective efficacy in flight simulation tasks. They point out that using confidence
measures at different levels of performance has been shown to· show greater variation
than use of yes/no questions for each performance level (c.f. Gist and Mitchell, 1992).
Therefore, confidence at each level was used for items 47 and 49. Item 50, the final
collective efficacy item, was a measure developed by the author. There is a
corresponding item in the Evaluator's questionnaire (see Appendix G). The collective
efficacy measure was calculated by averaging across the four items. Since the items
employed different scales, item scores were converted to standardized z-scores. The zscores were then averaged for the four items across individuals and then teams to arrive
at the collective efficacy score for each crew.
Transactive memory. Following the recommendation of Moreland et al. ( 1998),
transactive memory was evaluated through three direct indices: the agreement within a
group about who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what; the accuracy of
those beliefs. and the complexity (or strength) of those beliefs.
Agreement

Crew responsibilities (items 11-18 of Appendix F) were developed by the author
in coordination with experienced KC-135 crewmembers. These items are flight tasks
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with ill-defined responsibilities. In other words, there is no standard procedure for who
must accomplish these tasks. Therefore, they give a good indication of how well the
crew knows "who does what". Each item was scored by comparing answers across the
four crewmembers. If all four crewmembers agreed on that answer, the score was 100%
for that item. If only two members agreed the score was 50% and so on. If all four of
the crewmembers disagreed, the score was 0% for that item. The scores were then
averaged across the items. Similarly, the Crew Skills section (items 19-22) gives a good
indication of "who is good at what" and "who knows what". Level of agreement was
calculated as was done for the Crew Responsibilities section. Finally, items 26-29 of the
Crew Strengths section indicate "who is good at what". Level of agreement was
calculated as before. The final level of agreement score was derived by using a weighted
mean of all three agreement sections.
Accuracy

Accuracy of beliefs was measured using the Crew Strengths section (items 26-29
of Appendix F). Crew members were asked to rate each other's greatest strength in a
forced choice method from among three major flight areas: crew coordination, technical
proficiency, and systems/ emergency knowledge options. Each crewmember also rated
their own greatest strength (item 29, Appendix F) and the evaluator rated the
crewmember's greatest strength (item 5 Individual Evaluation, Appendix G). An
accuracy score was determined using both the self-reported strength and the evaluator
rated strength. For example, the copilot self reports that crew coordination is his greatest
strength. Two of the other three crewmembers also report that crew coordination is the
copilot's greatest strength. The self-report accuracy is then 67%. Meanwhile the
evaluator rates technical proficiency as the copilot's greatest strength as does one of the
three crewmembers. The evaluator accuracy rating is then 33%. The overall accuracy
score for the copilot is then the average of the two, in this case 50%. The accuracy rating
would be determined in like manner for the other three crewmembers. The accuracy
scores for the four crewmembers would then be averaged to produce one accuracy score
for the crew.

.---------------------------------~-------
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Strengths
Moreland et al. (1998) suggested using complexity of group members' beliefs
about one another's skills as a direct measure of knowledge in transactive memory.
Their measure of complexity consisted in how well subjects could describe each other's
strengths and weaknesses in knowledge and technical proficiency. A more direct
approach to this issue is a self-report measure. The Crew Strengths section (items 23-25
of Appendix F) assessed strength of belief level for each crewmember. A five-point
scale was used from: 1-"very limited knowledge" to 5- "as well as you can know them" ..
Strength of beliefs was simply the mean of each crewmember' s ratings. Crews with high
transactive memory should report higher knowledge of crew strengths.
The overall transactive memory score was a mean of the agreement, accuracy,
and strength scores. Analyses were also conducted using each of the three components
to investigate which component seemed to be the most important.
Crew Hardness. A measure of "crew hardness" was used to measure a construct
that captures how often crewmembers fly as an integral crew. Crew hardness was
determined on a percentage basis over the 90-day period prior to the evaluation. Crew
hardness was determined by dividing the number of times individual crewmembers flew
together over the total number of times flown over a three month period. These figures
were obtained from the Flight Records Division of the flying unit. For example, during
the ASEV checkride the AC flew with Co B, Nav C, and Boom D. In the previous 90
days the AC once flew with just Co B (.50), once with Co Band Nav C (.75), and once
with B, C, and D (1.0). The AC also flew with other crewmembers on one flight (.25) .
.The AC' s overall hardness figure would be .50. Meanwhile the Copilot had five flights
and his hardness score was .40 and the Nav had 3 flights and a hardness score of .60.
Finally the Boom had 6 flights and a hardness score of .70. The crew hardness score
would be
[(.50) + (.40) + (.60) + (.70)] I 4 = .55

Crew hardness was also calculated by weighting the individual hardness score by
the number of flights over the last 90 days. Using the numbers above the crew hardness
score would be as follows:
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[4(.50) + 5(.40) + 3(.60) + 6(.70)] / 4 = .56
Similar results were obtained using both procedures. In addition, number of
flights over the last 90 days was a separate control variable. For these reasons it was
determined to use only the first method of crew hardness calculation.
As mentioned previously, two crews completed their surveys after their checkride
flight. The crew hardness scores for the~e two crews were adjusted to include the
checkride flight in the crew hardness scores. The other evaluated crews' hardness score
did not include the checkride flight, but only flights in the previous 90 days. Analyses
revealed that adjusting the crew hardness scores in this manner did not alter overall
results.
Control Variables. A number of control variables were included to account for
individual differences in ability and experience. The first control variable was total
flight hours, which is an indication of experience and, to a lesser extent, ability. Total
flight hours was a self-report measure and the flight hours were summed for the entire
crew.
Instructor status was also a control variable. After a period of roughly three years
a person is selected for instructor school after demonstrating sound ability in their
position. Instructors receive special training on the aircraft and aircraft procedures and
in tum train younger crewmembers. Thus, Instructor status reflects both experience and
ability and the number of instructors aboard the aircraft was calculated for each crew.
Instructor status was determined via the Flight Records Section of the flying unit.
Duration of mission qualification, is the time that a crewmember has been
mission qualified (i.e. declared competent) in that crew position. This figure can range
from several months to over twenty years. This figure was obtained from Flights
Records and totaled for each crew providing another indication of crew experience.
Distinguished graduate status indicates those crewmembers who were
distinguished graduates in a flying or mission related training program. This is a
measure of ability and a self-report item. This variable was dummy coded for the crew,
with a 1 indicating that one or more crewmembers were distinguished graduates.
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Flights in last 90 days was the last control variable used. Number of flights in the
last ninety days is a common check the Air Force conducts to determine the "currency"
of air crewmembers. Currency helps to ensure that crewmembers remain proficient in
the aircraft. It is assumed that the more flights a crewmember has, the more proficient
they will become (up to a point). There are a minimum and maximum number of flights
allowed every ninety days. Number of flights can also be a proxy for experience or
ability. The instructors in a flying unit (those more experienced and with higher ability)
generally have additional duties which preclude them from flying a great deal. In other
words, the younger crewmembers do most of the flying, while the experienced
crewmembers supervise, administrate, and fly a little bit as well. In addition to flying
less, the instructors also tend to fly with a variety of different crewmembers when they
do fly. The number of flights in the last 90 days was obtained from the Flight Records
Division of the flying unit.
Criterion Variables. There were two criterion variables in this study. The first
was Critiques per Crew. For each checkride, individuals were rated on multiple items
(e.g. mission planning; weather avoidance, takeoff, situational awareness, etc.). On each
item an individual can receive a critique for not accomplishing the item in an error free
or proper manner. The Crew Critiques per Crew score was determined by adding up the
total number of critiques that were related to crew effectiveness. For example, if the
copilot received a critique for landings this would not be related to crew effectiveness.
· A poor landing is an individual deficiency. However, a critique for forgetting to lower
the gear on final approach would be a crew deficiency. The crewmember flying the
aircraft is primarily responsible for having the gear lowered, however each crewmember
is responsible for ensuring the gear is lowered on final approach to landing.
Evaluators annotate the number of critiques onto a standard Air Force checkride
form. Evaluators were asked to transfer the number of critiques related to crew
coordination onto the Evaluator's survey (see Appendix G).
The number of crew critiques for each individual crewmember was totaled and
divided by the number of crewmembers checked, to arrive at the Critiques per Crew
score. After all Critiques per Crew.scores were computed, the variable was then reverse
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scored so that a higher total indicates a better Critique score for the crew. This could be
considered the more objective of the two criterion variables since it was tied to specific
performance parameters.
The second Criterion variable was Overall Crew Evaluation (item 3 of Appendix
G). Each evaluator on the flight was asked to rate the overall crew performance. A
mean score was taken from the individual evaluator ratings. This measure could be
considered the more subjective of the two criterion variables.

Results
Determination of Significance. The individual sample size (n=76) of study 2 was
favorable. However, because there were four members per crew, Study 2 had a lower
crew sample size (n=19) than desired, despite enjoying an extremely high response rate
(95% ). Furthermore, when dealing with group level phenomenon, it is difficuH to reach
the "classic" alpha significance level of .05. Additionally, this was the first field study of
its kind and therefore was somewhat exploratory in nature. With these considerations in
mind. an alpha significance level of .10 was chosen and will be used for this study
(Cascio & Zedeck, 1983). All p values reported will be one-tailed unless noted
otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics. The variables of interest in this study were either
measured at the crew level or measured at the individual level and then aggregated to the
crew level. Therefore, checks for normality and other descriptive statistics were
performed on the crew level variables. A visual inspection of the data revealed no
serious departures from normality.
Control Variables. When it is stated that experience and ability were controlled,
the five control variables listed in Table 7 are the reference. Table 7 depicts the
correlations between the control variables and performance.
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. bles
T able 7 Corre1atlons
.
b etween contro an d peI'Dormance vana
Critiques per Crew# Overall Crew Evaluation
.32*
.16
Total Hours
.18
.17
Mission Qualified Duration
-.07
-.20
Distinguished Graduate
(Dummy Variable)
.34*
.32*
Instructors Onboard
-.58**
Flights
-.18
(Last 90 days)
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance
*p < .10, ** p < .05

Somewhat surprisingly, the distinguished graduate correlation was a negative
one. However, the correlation was quite low and does not approach significance. Of
greater concern, is the negative relationship between flights in the last ninety days and
performance. Recall from the earlier discussion of control variables that number of
flights can also be a proxy for experience or ability. Instructors (those more experienced
and with higher ability) generally have additional duties which preclude them from
flying a great deal. It is clear from Table 7 that a greater number of instructors on board
were highly positively related to Overall Crew evaluation. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the number of flights - performance relationship was a negative one. Stated another
way, having lots of flights in the last ninety days was an indication of less experience and
ability. Support for this claim can be seen in Table 8.
. d'1cators
T abl e 8 Corre Iations
.
between ff1g hts an d experience m
Flights (Last 90 days)

Total Hours

-.34*

Mission Qualified Duration

-.35*

Instructors Onboard

-.39*

*p < .10
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Transactive memory. The transactive memory variable was computed using the
means of the Agreement, Accuracy, and Strength components for each crew. Table 9
shows the correlations between the components and the transactive memory variable.
Strength showed the highest correlation with transactive memory and Accuracy the
lowest. While the three components showed good correlations with trans active memory,
the relationships among the components themselves were interesting. None of the
components was significantly related to another. Moreland and colleagues ( 1998)
reported highly correlated components, but this may have been due to common method
variance. Additionally, Strength and Accuracy exhibit a negative (but nonsignificant)
relationship with .one another (see Table 9).

.
T able 9 C orre1at10ns
b etween transact1ve memory components
Agreement
Strength
T.M.
Accuracy

Agreement
Accuracy

.19

Strength

.29

-.19

T.M.

.58***

.55***

.68***

***p < .01

Due to small crew sample size, factor analyses was not appropriate (Byrne,
1994). However. it seems from the relationships among the components that, as
measured, the transactive memory variable may consist of more than one factor. A look
at the descriptive statistics on Accuracy was revealing. Accuracy was very low among
all the crews. The mean score on Accuracy was .321; the median was .333. The lowest
crew Accuracy score possible was 0, indicating no accuracy. The highest is 1.0,
indicating perfect accuracy among crewmembers. This mean and median indicate that
the crews were very near the point of having only one out of four of the crewmembers
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being accurate on who had what strength. In other words, less than a third of the time
were crewmembers accurate about crew strengths.
Theoretically, it seems clear that Accuracy is a legitimate component of
Transactive memory. It may be that its measurement needs to be improved.
Crewmembers were asked to delineate between three closely related _strengths: crew
coordination, technical ability, and systems knowledge. This discrimination task may
have been too difficult. These results indicate that was indeed the case.

In light of the above discussion, the Accuracy component was eliminated from
the analyses. Due to the elimination of the Accuracy component and because the
remaining components were not significantly correlated, each component of transactive
memory was used separately to identify its effects on performance. This use of
individual components (i.e. no combining of components) is in accord with
recommendations of previous research (Moreland et al., 1998). Analyses indicated that
only the Strength component was of value as a separate and individual variable, while
Agreement showed little relation to the criterion variables. Strength was the selfreported measure of how well crewmembers know one another's strengths. It is much
easier to collect, measure, and judge than are the other two components of transactive
memory.
Collective efficacy. Collective efficacy was measured from four items on the
survey using three different scales. The scales were then combined and averaged
through z scores. The scales showed good interater reliability between individuals;
Cronbach's (1957) alpha was .68.
Criterion Variables. The two criterion variables, Critiques per Crew and Overall
Crew Evaluation exhibited a highly significant positive relationship (r = .63, p = .002).
Keep in mind, that Critiques per Crew were reverse scored so that higher critiques per
crew indicated better crew performance.
Hypothesis 1,2,3. After the data were examined for normality and the two
aggregate variables were analyzed, the hypotheses were tested in turn. The first three
hypotheses, state that teams with higher levels of transactive memory will outperform
teams with lower levels of transactive memory with greater than three team members
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and in the field. Therefore, crews with higher transactive memory scores should have
higher performance scores. After controlling for experience and ability (hours, mission
qualified duration, distinguished graduate status, instructors on board, and flights in the
last 90 days), there were indications of a positive relationship between one transactive
memory component and performance (see Table 10). Strength demonstrated a strong
positive relationship with the criterion variables. The relationship failed to reach
significance primarily due to the small sample size that resulted in only 12 degrees of
freedom after controlling for the five control variables. Agreement surprisingly revealed
a negative, but nonsignificant relationship with the criterion variables. This is likely due
to Agreement's negative relationship with number of instructors on board (r = .49, p =
.018). Recall from Table 7 that instructors was significantly related to the criterion
variables. However, since instructors tend to fly with a variety of crews, they exhibited
lower Agreement scores. These data provide partial support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.

T able 10 Part'1al corre1afions b etween TM . component s an d per£ormance

Critiques per Crew#

Overall Crew Evaluation

Agreement

-.10

-.23

Strength

.33

.21

# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance

Hypothesis 4. According to Hypothesis 4, turnover via the reconstitution of
teams. will negatively affect transactive memory and performance in tum. As previously
shown. there is evidence that transactive memory does positively affect performance. To
test whether turnover affects transactive memory, the crew hardness variable was used.
Greater crew hardness indicates crews that fly as an integral unit more often.
Alternatively, a low crew hardness score indicates crewmembers that frequently change
crews for each flight. To support Hypothesis 4, crew hardness should be highly
correlated with components of transactive memory, and it was (see Table 11 ). Strength
exhibits this relationship. Agreement failed to reach statistical significance, due to small
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sample size. This is another indication that Strength may was the more valuable
predictor variable. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is strongly supported.

Table 11. Correlations between transactive memory components and crew hardness
Crew Hardness

Agreement

.29

Strength

.57***

***p < .01

Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis states that teams trained together will foster
development of transactive memory systems which will result in increased performance
over others trained in separate teams. Since Fairchild is an operational base and not a
training base, this hypothesis could not be tested.
Hypothesis 6. Being assigned to the same flying squadron allows crewmembers
to interact in a flying environment without necessarily flying with one another on a
frequent basis. Hypothesis 6 suggests that this interaction over time will increase the
crew's transactive memory. To test this hypothesis, data was collected on how long
individuals had been assigned to the same squadron. Crews composed of members of
the same squadron (n=9) were examined to discover a possible correlation between time
in the squadron and transactive memory components. I hypothesized this would be a
positive relationship and it was for Strength (see Table 12). Again, Agreement was not a
useful predictor.

1
t able 1-·

.
C orre latlons
between squad ron time an d transactlve memory components
Time assigned to Squadron

Agreement

.03

Strength

.59**

**p < .05
Besides increased opportunity to interact and observe, being in the squadron
together increases member's chances of flying together·(see Table 13). There are four
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refueling squadrons located at Fairchild, but members of a squadron generally fly
together. However, even after controlling for Crew Hardness, time in the squadron is
still highly related to transactive memory (see Table 13). The relationship failed to reach
statistical significance for the components of transactive memory, however this can be
attributed to the small sample size (n=9) of crews from the same squadron. The
correlations themselves are positive and strong (see Table 13). Overall the results
provide some support Hypothesis 6, longer time assigned to the squadron is related to
development of transactive memory.

.
.h crew hardness and transactlve memory
T able 13 C orre1at10ns
o f squad ron time wit
Relationship
Controllin2 for:
Squadron Time - Flights
r = .55*
Crew Hardness
Squadron Time - Agreement
r= .27
Crew Hardness
Squadron Time - Strength
r= .36
*p < .10

Hypothesis 7. The seventh hypothesis states that collective efficacy will be a
predictor of flight crew performance. To test this hypothesis, collective efficacy was
correlated with both of the performance criterion variables. After controlling for
experience and ability collective efficacy demonstrates a strong relationship with
performance (see Table 14).

.
T abl e 14 P artia
. 1 C orre 1at1ons
between co11ective e ffi1cacy an d per ~ormance
Critiques per Crew#
Overall Crew Evaluation

Collective efficacy

.62***

.47**

# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance

** p < .05. ***p < .01
Two multiple regressions were also conducted, regressing each performance
variable onto the five control variables and collective efficacy. Both overall F-tests were
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significant (for Critiques per Crew: F=2.53, p<.10, 2-tailed; for Overall Crew
Evaluation: F=2.44, p<. l 0, 2-tailed). The lower p values can be attributed to a large
number of control variables in comparison to a smaller sample size. Of greater
importance is the change in R squared of the regressions after controlling for experience
and ability. The values are displayed in Table 15.

Table 15. Results of the analyses for performance regressed onto collective efficacy
after controlling for experience and ability

Collective efficacy

Critiques per Crew#

Overall Crew Evaluation

Change in Rsq = .28

Change in Rsq = .12

Fchange = 7.64**

Fchange = 3.33*

# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance
*p < .10, ** p < .05

The table highlights the fact that crew collective efficacy is explaining a healthy
portion of the variance in performance, particularly in Critiques per Crew, after
controlling for experience and ability variables. These finding strongly support
Hypothesis 7; collective efficacy predicts crew performance.
Hypothesis 8. Transactive memory will explain variance in flight crew
performance, above and beyond that of collective efficacy. The preceding results clearly
indicate that collective efficacy explains variance in performance. Previously, evidence
was presented indicating that the Strength component of transactive memory was
positively related to performance. but not at a statistically significant level. Partial
correlations were conducted to examine if the transactive memory components explain
variance above and beyond that of collective efficacy. When the effects of the five
control variables and collective efficacy were partialed out, Strength showed a nearly
zero relationship to performance (p>.10). Hypothesis 8 is not supported, transactive
memory does not predict performance above and beyond that of collective efficacy.
Further Analyses After reviewing the results above. additional analyses were
conducted to further examine the powerful variable. collective efficacy. Mischel and
Northcraft ( 1997) suggest that greater experience and ability should lead to higher
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collective efficacy. Bivariate correlations between the five control factors and collective
efficacy support this contention (see Table 16). Correlations are clearly positive, except
for Flights in the last 90 days which is an indication of less experience as discussed
earlier.

Table 16. Correlations between control variables and collective efficacy.
Collective efficacy
.33*
.27
.22
.43*
-.16

Total Hours
Mission Qualified Duration
Distinguished Graduate (Dummy Variable)
Instructors Onboard
Flights (Last 90 days)
*p < .10

It seems likely that higher levels of transactive memory will lead to higher collective
efficacy as discussed in Chapter 2 (Mischel & Northcraft, 1997; Gist & Mitchell, 1992;
Bandura, 1982). Partialing out the effects of experience and ability, correlations were
conducted between transactive memory components and collective efficacy. There is a
clear and strong relationship between the two as exhibited in Table 17 for Strength.
Agreement exhibited no relationship with collective efficacy, providing further evidence
that Strength is the most important predictor variable.
Table 17. Correlations between transactive memory and collective efficacy controlling
11ty
~or experience an d abT
Collective efficacy
Agreement

.00

Strength

.64***

***p<.01

Is it possible to show that Crew Hardness is related to collective efficacy?
Intuitively it seems reasonable that a crew that flies together often would develop higher
collective efficacy. Further analyses were conducted to determine if crew hardness
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would directly predict collective efficacy. Crew hardness was positively correlated with
collective efficacy, however, this relationship was mediated by Strength (see Table 18).
This supports the contention that the mechanism that translates crew hardness into
collective efficacy is transactive memory. Agreement did not mediate this relationship.
This is not surprising given the fact that there was no relationship between Agreement
and collective efficacy (see Table 17).

Table 18. Correlations between collective efficacy and crew hardness and transactive
memo
Controlling for:
Five Control Variables
Crew Hardness - Collective efficac
Alone
.46**
.49**
-.01
** p < .05

Discussion of Study 2
In the second study, collective efficacy was the key variable in explaining aircrew
performance. As hypothesized, collective efficacy was clearly related to both criterion
variables. A component of transactive memory, Strength, was positively related to
performance as well, but did not reach statistical significance. With increased sample
size, transactive memory may indeed be predictive of performance. However, the results
of Study 2 indicate that the transactive memory was strongly related to collective
efficacy, which was not hypothesized. but is in accord with theory on collective efficacy
(Mischel & Northcraft. 1997).
Of the transactive memory components, it is clear that Strength was the most
potent predictor of both performance and collective efficacy. Moreland and colleagues
(1998) reported highly correlated transactive memory components in their lab studies
using radio assembly. Similar to this study. they had planned to examine the effect of
each component separately. However, because the components were highly correlated a
combined measure of transactive memory was used by Moreland. This ·high correlation
may have been due to common method variance. \Vhat is clear from Study 2 is that
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Strength was the "star performer". This is a positive finding. Strength is much easier to
collect and calculate than are the other two components. It is simply a self-report
measure of how well each crewmember knows the strengths of other crewmembers using
a five-point lickert scale. Whereas Agreement requires a series of questions concerning
"who does what and who knows what". The Agreement score must be calculated by
comparing responses across crewmembers for each question which is time consuming.
Furthermore, it requires the researcher to generate the series of questions for each type of
task. Similarly, a researcher would be required to generate a list of items to be scored
individually for the Accuracy component. As was seen in Study 2, finding the right
series of questions may be difficult. Floor and ceiling effects must be avoided. Study 2
suffered from floor effects.
The major variable of interest, transactive memory, was found to be effected
negatively by increased turnover, as hypothesized. Consistently substituting
crewmembers onto crews adversely affects transactive memory. The more a crew flies
together as a unit, the higher their transactive memory. Additionally, transactive
memory clearly mediated a strong crew hardness - collective efficacy relationship.
Transactive memory seems to be the mechanism through which crew hardness is
translated into collective efficacy.
Finally, it seems that flying crewmembers from the same squadron as a crew is
associated with higher levels of transactive memory. The evidence presented supports
this contention. Because crewmembers from the same squadron have greater
opportunity to fly together, this finding was not surprising. However, even after
controlling for these increased flying opportunities; increased time in the squadron was
associated with higher levels of transactive memory. This finding is not as intuitive.
Overall, these results suggest the series of relationships exhibited in Figure 4.

65

Crew Hardness

Experience & Ability

'IV
Transactive memory
(Strength)

7

~

Collective efficacy 7 Performance

Time in Squadron

Figure 4. A revised model of the transactive memory/ collective efficacy process.
Transactive memory is positioned in such a way that indicates that it is predictive
of collective efficacy. This seems to be the logical sequence. Intuitively, it would seem
that a crew that better knows who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what,
would be a more confident crew. It is less likely that because a crew is more confident
they would then acquire such a knowledge system. This model conflicts slightly with the
model proposed by Peterson et al. (1996). They found that early collective efficacy
predicted later shared mental models. There are key differences between Study 2 and the
Peterson et al. (1996) study. First, the teams in Peterson et al. had little history as a team
prior to the first measurement of collective efficacy and mental models. Whereas, in
many cases the teams in Study 2 had a well established history before the study began.
Second, shared mental models and transactive memory are similar, but not identical
constructs. It seems reasonable that it would take time to establish shared mental
models, and with no prior history it was unlikely that such models would emerge early in
a team's tenure. Alternatively, there could be clues early in a team's development about
who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what, and therefore transactive
. memory could perhaps be established more quickly than shared mental models.
It should be noted that these results do not infer that crews with lower collective
efficacy perform poorly on flights. Nor do they infer that lower transactive memory
leads to poor performance. Indeed the majority of the crews evaluated were satisfactory
performers. Only one crew of nineteen received an unsatisfactory evaluation rating.
Additionally, 14 of the 19 crews were rated as "average" or better by the evaluators. It
seems that the majority of the crews were good performers.
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So it seems that higher collective efficacy separates the "exceptional" crew from
the "average" crew. Variables which improve collective efficacy are crew hardness (lack
of turnover), transactive memory, and of course experience and ability. So it seems that
whatever the squadron leadership can do to keep crews together, would be beneficial to
their crew confidence and performance in tum. Experience and ability are also
indicative of the "exceptional crew". Increasing the number of instructors on board
increases both collective efficacy and performance. However, during this period when
the Air Force is facing nearly a crisis situation in failing to retain highly experienced
aircrewmembers (Wall Street Journal, 2 June 1999), squadron leadership has a
dwindling capability to just "put more instructors on board". They must find other
means to increase crew confidence. Flying crews together and thereby increasing
transactive memory seems to be one way the leadership can influence confidence and
performance.
The data suggest that instructors tend to fly together less often than the "line"
flyers and this is as it should be. However, I propose that if instructors flew as hard
crews more often, they would improve their performance scores to an even greater
degree. It is also possible that higher transactive memory levels of less experienced
crews may help to keep their performance from dipping to unsatisfactory levels.
This study also informs theory on the development of collective efficacy. Results
seem clear that one way to increase the team's collective efficacy is through transactive
memory. Developing the team member's ability to determine who knows what, who
does what. and who is good at what should increase team confidence. Previous
theoretical work has pointed to the important role of enactive mastery (Bandura, 1982) in
developing collective efficacy. It seems that at least one vehicle used by enactive
mastery to translate experience into efficacy is transactive memory. This has important
implications for efficacy theory.
Theoretically, there seem to be two determinants of transactive memory. First, as
Moreland and colleagues ( 1998) discovered, a team working on a task together over time
mcreases transactive memory. This study supports this previous theoretical and
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empirical work by showing that greater crew hardness leads to higher transactive
memory.
Second, it seems that a team may not be required to be engaged in their primary
task to increase their transactive memory. It seems that other conditions besides flying
together may help build transactive memory. One such variable is time together in an
organization; in this case a flying squadron. People talk, you hear rumors, you see
people interact during mission planning, in flying safety meetings, etc., and you get some
idea of how competent they are around an airplane. You get some idea (by observing
and / or listening) whattheir strengths and weaknesses are as well. Simply interacting
and observing over time while engaged in auxiliary activities related to the primary task
may be sufficient to increase the team's transactive memory. A practical application of
this finding is to encourage organizational member interactions in discussions and or
exercises related to the task or task components. This would be especially important if a
team cann~t be frequently engaged in the task due to expense, time, etc. Group
techniques such as "pulling part success" via the sharing of "war stories" may be one
vehicle to increase transactive memory. Another practical application is to encourage
leadership to compose crews from the same squadron whenever possible.
The major shortcoming of this study was the small number of crews evaluated.
The inspectors hoped to have a sample size of 25 crews. However, real world
commitments such as the Kosovo ·crisis, drastically reduced the number of crews
available to be evaluated. This smaller sample size likely kept the transactive memory performance relationship from reaching significance. However, with the negative also
comes with a positive. Several strong relationships were found even with a small sample
size. This is indicative of some robust relationships among the variables; in particular
those related to collective efficacy and performance.
Study 2 provided a rigorous field test of transactive memory and collective
efficacy in an operational Air Force environment. It is one of the few tests of such
constructs outside of the laboratory. In an effort to extend the understanding of the role
of transactive memory and collective efficacy in aircrew performance, a second study of
Air Force KC-135 crews was conducted at Altus AFB. OK. The site provided an
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opportunity to replicate the results of study .2 on a similar sample. However, there were
important differences between the two samples. Fairchild AFB is an operational base
while Altus AFB is a training base for new KC-135 crewmembers. This results in two
different atmospheres: a mission first versus a training first focus. Furthermore, there
was a variation in experience, Fairchild providing the "average" crewmember, while
Altus has the "new" KC-135 crewmember.
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Chapter 6
Study 3: Altus.AFB

Methods
Overview
Study 3 was similar to Study 2. Study 3 used Air Force flight teams at Altus
AFB, Oklahoma. Altus AFB primarily differs from Fairchild AFB in that it is a training
base, where KC-135 crews receive initial qualification training in the KC-135. Levels of
transactive memory and collective efficacy were evaluated prior to an operational aircraft
check flight. Independent evaluators provided performance measures for the flight.
Subjects and Setting
Subjects were actual Air Force KC-135 aircrews undergoing qualification
training at Altus AFB in Altus, Oklahoma. Altus is the primary KC-135 training base
for the United States Air Force. The aircraft and aircrew positions are similar to those
described in Study 2. Crew positions are identical with one exception. Altus is
beginning a transition to the KC-135 with a Pacer Crag modification. This modification
includes advanced navigation equipment available to the pilots and this eliminates the
need for a Navigator. Crews flying the Pacer Crag do not employ a Navigator. Six of
the fifteen aircraft used in this sample were Pacer Crag modified.
A total of 44 crewmembers participated. However, one of those individuals was
on an aircraft with only one trainee and was dropped from the sample. This resulted in a
sample of 43 (of a possible 45) individuals and a total of 15 aircrews. Only trainees were
surveyed on the checkflight; of the 15 crews only two trainees failed to respond. On
several flights, permanent party instructors (those assigned to instruct at Altus, n=9)
served as crcwmembcrs for positions with no trainees and were not surveyed. Subjects
served on a volunteer basis. No gender data were available.
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Procedure and Task

At Altus, the AC, Co, Nav, and Boom are undergoing initial qualification in the
aircraft. Therefore, each training flight is conducted under the supervision of an
instructor in that respective position. The Instructor Pilot (IP) supervises both AC and
Copilot training. The AC in training is generally upgrading from the copilot position,
but is sometimes transitioning from another aircraft. Other than the AC in training, the
crewmembers are new to the aircraft. At the end of the training program (after
approximately eight training flights, depending on weather and training continuity) the
trainees receive a checkride similar to the one described in Study 2 to determine their
suitability to be declared proficient in the KC-135. During the checkride, the trainees do
not fly with an instructor, but rather with an evaluator who is expert in that crew
position.
During the training program, trainees were briefed on and encouraged to
participate in the research process by squadron leadership. As part of their mission
planning package prior to their checkride, aircrew members received a package of
surveys similar to the one used at Fairchild AFB (see Appendix I). The surveys were
filled out anonymously by the crewmembers, returned to the crew envelope, and sealed.
The envelopes were then mailed to the investigator by the squadron administration
section. The survey assessed transactive memory, collective efficacy, total flight hours,
and whether the crewmember was a distinguished graduate from flight training. After
the checkride was completed, the evaluator filled out a questionnaire regarding the
aircrew's performance on the checkride. This questionnaire focused on transactive
memory, and overall aircrew performance (see Appendix G). Both questionnaires were
accompanied by a cover letter (see Appendix H). The same portions o_f the survey were
analyzed in Studies 2 and 3 so that comparisons could be drawn between the samples.

Measures

Collective Efficacy. Collective efficacy was measured exactly as described in
Study 2.
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Transactive memory. Transactive memory was measured as described in Study
2. As will be highlighted in the Results section, Accuracy again demonstrated a low
mean. Due to this fact, coupled with a desire to remain consistent across studies,
analyses were only conducted using the two transactive memory components, Agreement
and Strength.
Crew Training Hardness. Originally Study 3 was designed to have two training
conditions comparing crews trained as integral crews versus those trained in a random
crew pattern. Until recently the two squadrons at Altus practiced these two training
methods. Recently, the second squadron began to shift to an integral or "hard crew"
training philosophy because they felt that it provided better training for the crews. Due
to these changes in crew scheduling, a different measure of "crew training hardness" was
used to determine how transactive memory;performance, collective efficacy, and crew
·training hardness relate.
Crew training hardness is a construct that captures how often the trainees fly as
an integral crew. Crew training hardness was calculated by summing the number of
times during the program that the trainees flew with other crewmembers of the
checkflight crew. This number was then divided by the total number of dyads possible.
For example. see Figure 5 below:

AC-Co
AC-Nav
AC-Bo

7 flights
0 flights
4 flights

Co-Nav
Co_Bo
Nav-Boom

0 flights
4 flights
0 flights

The Crew Training Hardness score would be: (7 + 0 + 4 + 0 + 4 + O] / 6 = 2.5

Figure 5 . .-\n illustration of how Crew Training Hardness totals were calculated.

Crew Training Hardness was also calculated between only trainees (ignoring
dyads with permanent party instructors) on board the flight. Results of analyses using
the Crew Training Hardness variable did not change. Therefore, crew training hardness

----------------------------------~--------
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as calculated in the example will be reported. Number of flights together was·a selfreport item.
Control Variables. Two control variables were included to account for individual
differences in ability and experience. The first was total hours per trainee. This was a
self-report measure. Hours for the trainees were added for the crew and then divided by
the number of trainees on board. The total hours did not include those of the permanent
party instructors flying as crewmembers on the flight. These data were excluded
primarily so as not to skew the hours data for the trainees, who were the subjects of
interest. Additionally, these data were not available and since the instructors were not
being evaluated they were considered to be of no importance. As a footnote, all the
instructors at Altus have a similar number of total flying hours.
The second control variable was number of instructors on board. In Study 2 this
was an important variable. It should be noted that the number of instructors on board has
a different meaning in Study 3. At Fairchild, an instructor was either being evaluated or
vulnerable to be evaluated. This was not the case at Altus. Permanent party instructors
were not evaluated on the trainees' checkrides. Rather, they simply acted as competent
crewmembers filling a position on the aircraft and were treated as peers by the trainees.
Therefore, each instructor on board represented "one less person to worry about" for the
trainees. While they still interacted as fellow crewmembers, the trainees knew that the
instructors would not intentionally ignore proper procedures and techniques. Due to
their vast experience, the instructors could be counted on by the trainees to do a
proficient job without close monitoring and scrutiny. This potentially allowed the
trainees to primarily focus monitoring and attention towards the other .trainee
crewmembers on board. It also provided less opportunities for critiques of crew
coordination by the evaluators. While the trainees could be critiqued for improper
coordination with the instructors, it was highly unlikely that the instructor would engage
in such actions or communication so as to be critiqued for his or her interaction with the
trainee. The presence of instructors also provided a more stable environment, which
should enhance the Overall Crew Evaluation rating. Number of instructors on board was
determined by trainee answers to item 6 of the student surYey (see Appendix I).

73
Initially, Distinguished graduate status from undergraduate flying programs was
to be a third control variable. However, only 3 of 43 respondents reported being a
distinguished graduate. As a result, this variable was dropped as a control variable.
The other two control variables in Study 2 were not suitable for Study 3.
Duration of mission qualification was not applicable as these trainees were not yet
mission qualified. The number of flights in the last 90 days was also not applicable.
These trainees were at Altus for the previous 90-day period undergoing training,
therefore, the number of flights was very similar across subjects.

Results
Determination of Shmificance. Similar to Study 2 and for the same reasons, an
alpha significance level of .10 was chosen for Study 3. All p values reported will be
one-tailed unless noted otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics. The variables of interest in this study were either
measured at the crew level or measured at the individual level and then aggregated to the
crew level. Therefore, checks for normality and other descriptive statistics were
performed on the crew level variables. A visual inspection of the data revealed no
serious departures from normality.
Control Variables. The two control variables in Study 3 were the hours per
trainee on the aircraft and the number of permanent party instructors on board. When it
is stated that experience and ability were controlled for, these two control variables are
the reference. Table 19 depicts the correlations between the control variables and
performance.

.
. bles
T abl e 19 C orre 1at10ns
b etween contro an d pertormance vana
Critiques per Crew#
Overall Crew Evaluation
(Subjective Performance)
( Objective Performance)
Total Hours per trainee
.06
.04
Instructors Onboard
.31
.17
# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance
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Not surprisingly, hours per trainee were not significantly related to performance.
This is a training environment where the aircraft is new and unfamiliar to all but the AC
(and sometimes the AC can be new to the aircraft). Those with more previous flying
time generally tend to possess more "airsense" on the first couple of training flights.
However, by the time of the checkride evaluation, crewmembers are generally on equal
footing in regards to time in the aircraft and so effects of previous flying experience are
diminished. This is in contrast to the Fairchild study where previous flying experience
almost always translated into previous KC-135 experience. At-test revealed that the
Altus sample was significantly lower (p<.001) in terms of flying hours per crewmember
than was the Fairchild sample.
As was seen at Fairchild, number of instructors on board had a positive
correlation with crew evaluations (see Table 19). This relationship failed to reach
significance due to small sample size. This finding was not surprising due to the positive
effect of the presence of instructors discussed earlier.
Transactive memory. The transactive memory variable was initially computed
using the means of the Agreement, Accuracy, and Strength components for each crew.
Table 20 shows the correlations between the components and the transactive memory
variable. Accuracy showed the highest correlation with transactive memory and
Agreement the lowest. This is in contrast to Fairchild, where Strength showed the
highest and Accuracy the lowest correlation with transactive memory. Why the
difference between Study 1 and 2? At Altus only trainees completed surveys, so on most
crews there were fewer individuals completing the accuracy rating on one another,
increasing the likelihood of greater accuracy. For example the highest Accuracy score
recorded by a crew was a perfect 1.0. However this crew only contained two trainees.
Therefore, the two trainees had to only agree on one another's greatest strength judgment
and the evaluator's judgment (a total of 4 agreements) to produce the perfect Accuracy
score. In contrast, a crew of four trainees would have to agree on three others· greatest
strength judgments plus the evaluator's judgments (a total of 24 agreements) to produce
a perfect 1.0 score. Furthermore. the crew recording the second highest Accuracy score
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also contained just two trainees. It is clear that the Accuracy score could be easily
skewed by number of trainees on board. Indeed, Accuracy was negatively correlated
with number of trainees on board (r =-.38, p

=.085).

As in Study 2, the Altus crews also scored very low on the Accuracy component.
This is surprising given that possibility for greater accuracy with fewer crewmembers
completing ratings. Indeed, crews did score slightly higher on Accuracy at Altus (mean
.348) over Fairchild (mean .321), but the difference was not statistically significant.
Similar to Study 2, only about a third of the time were crewmembers accurate about crew
strengths
As in Study 2, none of the transactive memory components were significantly
related to another. Because of the suspect nature of the Accuracy scores, their low
means, and in order to remain consistent across studies, Accuracy was dropped from the
analyses in Study 3. Therefore, the components of transactive memory used in Study 2
(Agreement and Strength) will also be reported for Study 3.

.
T able 20 C orrelatlons
between transacuve memory component s
Agreement
T.M.
Accuracy
Strength
Agreement
Accuracy

.19

Strength

.19

.07

T.M.

.49**

.85***

.52**

**p < .05. ***p < .01

Collective efficacy. Collective efficacy was measured from four items on the
survey using three differem scales. The scales were then combined and averaged
through z scores. The scales showed good interater reliability between individuals;
Cronbach·s (1957) alpha was .73.
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Criterion Variables. Unlike Study 2, the two criterion variables, Critiques per
Crew and Overall Crew Evaluation did not exhibit a significant positive relationship (r =
.14, n.s.). Keep in mind, that Critiques per Crew were reverse scored so that higher
critiques per crew indicated better crew performance. There are two possible
explanations for this result. First, the Overall Crew Evaluation rating could have been
influenced by the presence of permanent party instructors acting as crewmembers during
the trainee's flight. This presence could have created "a halo effect" for the trainees by
giving the impression that the trainee's crew coordination skills were stronger than they
actually were. The smooth crew effectiveness could actually have been facilitated by the
presence of the instructors, not the abilities of the trainees. Support for this argument is
derived from the positive correlations between number of instructors on board and
Overall Crew Evaluation shown in Table 19. The correlation is higher than that of the
Instructor - Critiques per Crew value.
On the other hand, the Critiques per Crew rating could be in error. Because it is a
training environment, there tend to be a greater number of critiques on a checkride at
Altus compared to an operational base such as Fairchild. It may be more difficult to
separate the critiques related to effective crew functioning and other types of critiques.
As a result, the Critiques per Crew value may not be as accurate as it would be in an
environment with less total critiques. Likely due to the inexperience of the ratees, the
mean number of Critiques per Crewmember was nearly double at Altus (mean = 1.625)
of what it was for Fairchild (mean = .886). These greater number of critiques, leave
open the possibility that it was more difficult to separate crew functioning critiques from
individual critiques.
In sum. it is difficult to identify the most appropriate Criterion variable in Study
3. Therefore, results using both criterion variables will be reported, keeping in mind that
any disparity in results must be questioned.
Hypothesis l,2,3. After the data were examined for normality and the two
aggregate variables were analyzed, the hypotheses were tested in turn. The first three
hypotheses. state that teams with higher levels of transactive memory will outperform
teams with lower levels of transactive memory with greater than three team members
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and in the field. Therefore, crews with higher transactive memory scores should have
higher performance scores. After partialing out the effects of experience and ability,
transactive memory components do have a positive relationship with the performance
variables (see Table 21)
~

Table 21. Partial correlations between T.M. components and performance

Critiques per Crew#

Overall Crew Evaluation

Agreement

-.13

.21

Strength

.34

.20

#· Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance
***p < .01

Strength demonstrated positive relationships with both criterion variables. It is
noteworthy that these correlations are very similar to those in Study 2 (see Table 10),
indicating high consistency in these·relationships across samples. Unfortunately, due to
small sample size, none of these correlations reached a statistically significant level.
Agreement demonstrated a positive relationship with Overall Crew Evaluation, but a
nonsignificant negative relationship with Critiques per Crew. Recall, that the two
criterion variables were not highly correlated. Taken as a whole, there is some support
for Hypotheses 1-3, that transactive memory positively influences performance.
Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 deals with the effect of turnover on transactive
memory and performance in turn. This idea is considered in Hypothesis 5, by using a
measure of consistency in crew composition. See the Hypothesis 5 section for the
results.
Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis concerns the effects of training on performance.
It was hypothesized that teams trained together will foster development of transactive

memory systems which will result in increased performance over others trained in
separate teams:
Previously. we saw that there was evidence that transactive memory components
predict performance. Bivariate correlations were conducted to determine the relationship
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between crew training hardness and transactive memory. Strength showed strong
positive correlations with crew training hardness (see Table 22). Similar to Study 2 (see
Table 11 ), Agreement was not related to crew hardness. Again, this is an indication that
Strength is the most effective predictor of the transactive memory components. The
strong relationship between crew training hardness and Strength supports the contention
that training crews together positively effects transactive memory. These results also
support Hypothesis 4, that increased turnover will negatively effect transactive memory
and performance in turn.

Table 22. Correlations between transactive memory and crew hardness
Crew Hardness

Agreement

.10

Strength

.56**

**p < .05

In further analyses, partial correlations were conducted to test whether Crew
Training Hardness predicted performance after controlling for experience and ability.
Results indicate that Crew Training Hardness had practically no relationship with either
Critiques per Crew (r=.03, n.s.) or Overall Crew Evaluation (r=-.07, n.s.) after
controlling for experience and ability. In sum, Hypothesis 5 is supported.
Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 deals with the duration of squadron assignment
being positively related to transactive memory. Aircrews trained and evaluated at Altus
are kept within the same squadron, therefore, this hypothesis could not be tested.
Hypothesis 7. The seventh hypothesis states that collective efficacy will be a
valid predictor of flight crew performance. To test this hypothesis, collective efficacy
was correlated with both the performance criterion variables. After controlling for
experience and ability, collective efficacy demonstrated no significant relationship with
performance (see Table 23).
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Table 23. Partial Correlations between collective efficac and erformance

Collective efficacy

Critiques per Crew#

Overall Crew Evaluation

-.09

.18

# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance

These results yvere surprising in light of previous research and the results of
Study 2. It seems that the young training crews at Altus may have been suffering from a
naive sense of overconfidence. When their confidence levels are compared with those of
the more mature and experienced crews at Fairchild, the Altus crews show higher
efficacy levels (t32= 1.43, p=.081 ). The results are more starkly contrasted in one of the
four collective efficacy components; confidence level that at least one member of the
crew will receive an "Exceptional Performance" rating on the checkride. Exceptional
Performance (EP) ratings are rare (given to approximately 10% of all evaluatees) and
therefore confidence of its occurrence should be lower. However, the Altus crews
showed significantly higher levels (t32=2.36, p=.012) of efficacy on this component (see
Table 24)

Table 24. Collective efficacy levels at Altus and Fairchild
% Confident of an
Exceptional Performance
Ratin
**p < .05

Altus

Fairchild

75.39**

62.46

These results could indicate a failure to predict due to inflated efficacy levels or
perhaps efficacy's inability to predict performance with a lack of experience and ability.
Regardless of the reasoning, Hypothesis 7 was not supported.
Hvpothesis 8. Hypothesis 8 asserts that transactive memory will explain variance
in flight crew performance, above and beyond that of collective efficacy. Previously we
saw indications that transactive memory was predictive of performance after controlling
for experience and ability. Does this relationship change when we control for the effects
of collecti\'e efficacy? Correlations between transactive memory components and
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performance were conducted controlling for the effects of experience, ability, and
collective efficacy. The results are seen in Table 25.
Table 25. Correlations between T.M. components and performance controlling for
collective efficacy

Critiques per Crew#

Overall Crew Evaluation

Agreement

-.12

.19

Strength

.36

.17

# Reverse scored so that more critiques per crew relates to higher performance
***p < .01

Whe_n compared with the Results of Table 21 where only experience and ability
were controlled for, it is clear that the relationships between transactive memory
components and performance showed minimal change. This indicates that collective
efficacy did not mediate the transactive memory - performance relationship. Due to the
small sample size the relationships did not reach statistical significance. However, the
relationships are clearly in the positive direction for Strength and in once case for
Agreement. On the whole, these results provide partial support for Hypothesis 8.
Further Analyses As was done in Study 2, further analyses were conducted to
inv·estigate the relationships of other variables with the key variables of transactive
memory and collective efficacy. Bivariate correlations between the two control factors
and collective efficacy were examined first (see Table 26). Correlations are lower than
in Study 2, and surprisingly collective efficacy showed no relationship with hours per
trainee or number of instructors on board. This provides evidence that collective
efficacy scores were naively inflated as will be explored in the Discussion section.
Table 26. Correlations between control variables and collective efficacy

Collective efficacy
Total Hours
Instructors Onboard

-.02
.11
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Also as in Study 2, partial correlations were conducted between transactive
memory components and collective efficacy (see Table 27). The relationship between
Strength and collective efficacy was not nearly as strong (about one third as strong, see
Table 17 for contrast) as it was in Study 2. However, the relationship between the two
was positive. Again results failed to attain statistical significance due to small crew
sample size. Agreement showed little relationship with collective efficacy in either
study.

Table 27. Correlations between transactive memory and collective efficacy controlling
tor expenence and abT
11ty
Collective efficacy
Agreement

.10

Strength

.18

Discussion of Study 3
Two findings stand out in Study 3. First are the encouraging results indicating a
positive relationship between transactive memory and performance. While failing to
reach statistical significance, these results clearly indicated a positive relationship
between transactive memory components and performance after controlling for
experience and ability. Strength again was the most potent transactive memory
component, while Agreement offered little explanatory power. The second finding was
the diminished importance of collective efficacy in predicting performance at Altus AFB
(vis-a-vis Fairchild). Both of the findings need to be explored in the light of higher
collective efficacy levels and the different environments involved.
The training crews at Altus clearly exhibited higher overall efficacy levels than
the Fairchild crews. In particular they were much more confident of attaining the highest
(and rare) performance rating of "Exceptional Performance". It would seem that the
crews were a bit naive on this poim. It could be that the training crews were unaware
(due to lower experience with checkrides) of the difficulties involved with doing well on .
the checkride. Alternatively, these high collective efficacy levels could be a form of
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impression management, where the crews know that it is socially desirable for aircrew
members to appear confident, or even "cocky". It could be that the instructors failed to
· give the trainees a realistic expectation concerning checkride results, in particular the
chance of an EP rating. However, these warnings c·ould have been received from the
instructors, but not heeded by the trainees. Perhaps in an effort to increase efficacy
through verbal persuasion (Bandura, 1982), the instructors could have intentionally
convinced the trainees that they had a high probability of maximum success on the
checkride.
Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the trainees' reported higher efficacy
levels. It is incredulous that a younger, more inexperienced crewmember would have
higher efficacy scores than a mature KC-135 crewmember. Perhaps this false bravado
explains the lack of significance of the collective efficacy score with performance.
There could be a ceiling effect on efficacy and as a result a lack of variance in the
variable to exhibit predictive power. Evidence for this claim is as follows. Altus crews
had higher mean scores than Fairchild crews on all four efficacy components (only one
reached statistical significance). Two of the efficacy components had a mean rating near
~he highest possible level for crews at both Fairchild and Altus. The two remaining
components were "confidence of an EP rating" (with Altus scoring significantly higher)
and "chances of three critiques or less on the checkride" (with Altus scoring higher, but
not reaching statistical significance). If these higher means indicate unrealistic collective
efficacy judgments, these values would increase random error and result in lower
correlation values.
Though it is clear that Altus had (unjustifiably) higher collective efficacy levels,
there may be another reason that collective efficacy lost its predictive power at Altus.
Altus is a training base where crewmembers have less experience and ability in the KC135 aircraft than do crews at an operational base such as Fairchild. Perhaps in the
absence of high levels of experience and ability, collective efficacy may not separate the
average crew from the exceptional crew. It may only be at higher levels of ability that
collective efficacy makes a difference. As an analogy, in professional sports we often
hear the expression "at this level it becomes a mental game. do you think you can win,
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when the other guy doesn't". Collective efficacy may be a separator at these greater
experience and ability levels. But during training other constructs may be more
important.
Transactive memory enjoyed a positive relationship with performance with or
without the presence of collective efficacy. Training together as a team and learning
"who knows what, who does what, and who is good at what" may be more important
when becoming proficient at a complex task. It could be that this knowledge allow.s one
to focus on other aspects of the task and less on the teamwork component. Additionally,
as hypothesized in the Discussion of Study 2, the higher transactive memory scores of
less experienced crews may keep their performance from dipping to unsatisfactory
levels.
How do the findings of Study 3 compare with the revised model presented in
Study 2? The answer is: very favorably. Figure 4 is presented again below as Figure 6
for convenience.
Crew Hardness

Experience & Ability

\V
Transactive memory
(Strength)

7

~

Collective efficacy 7 Performance
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Time in Squadron

Figure 6. A revised model of the transacti\'e memory / collective efficacy process.

The results of Study 3 clearly indicate that Crew Hardness was highly related to
the transactive memory components. Time in the Squadron was not a variable in Study
3. Transactive memory and its components were related to collective efficacy, but not to
the degree seen in Study 2. This could be due to the inflation of collective efficacy or the
difference in flying environments.
The control variables of experience and ability were not as important for
collective efficacy at Altus. This can be explained by remembering that experience and
ability were much lower at Altus as compared to Fairchild. while collective efficacy was
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higher at Altus than at Fairchild. The artificial inflation of collective efficacy is likely to
blame for the lack of relationship between experience, ability, and efficacy.
Furthermore, it was found that collective efficacy was not predictive of
performance. This result was somewhat surprising after collective efficacy's strong role
in performance in Study 2. As was stated earlier, collective efficacy may have been
naively inflated at Altus. It is also equally likely that collective efficacy's role in
performance may not be as important when experience and ability are low. Other factors
(including transactive memory) may play a larger part under these conditions.
The relationship between transactive memory and performance was quite
consistent between samples. There are good indications that transactive memory and its
components are predictive of performance. Unfortunately, due to small sample size these
correlations did not reach statistical significance. Similarly, it was found that the
relationship between transactive memory and collective efficacy was positive. However,
this relationship was not nearly as strong as it was in Study 2. Again, this could be due
to the collective efficacy inflation at Altus or it could be due to the difference in flying
environments. Perhaps the role of transactive memory in collective efficacy is weaker in
situations where experience and ability are not well developed
The shortcomings of Study 3 are similar to those of Study 2; a small sample size.
The number .of individuals surveyed was 43. However, once the individuals were placed
into their crews (which is the variable of interest) the sample size falls to 15. Efforts
were made to increase the sample size. However two forces acted against this effort.
First, the investigator could not be on site to encourage and monitor participation.
Second, a portion of the permanent party instructors at Altus AFB were dispatched to
participate in the real world conflict in Kosovo. Therefore, those instructors left behind
were left with an even higher workload than normal. Prior to the conflict, the squadrons
were already below 100% manning, so the Kosovo deployment worsened an already high
workload situation. Therefore, instructors did not always make time for returning
surveys. Additionally, those instructors charged with ensuring the student crews
received surveys were distracted by other primary duties.
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The flip side of the small sample size issue is the fact that significant findings can
be viewed as robust relationships among the variables that were not a product of "just
more data". In particular, strong relationships were found between crew training
composition and transactive memory.
The practical applications of these findings are to encourage the leadership at
Altus AFB to make crew consistency a top priority in scheduling training sorties. This
should pay offwith better performance at the end of the training program. In tum,
operational squadrons, such as Fairchild, will then be receiving crewmembers able to
perform at a higher level. Transactive memory was clearly more important to
performance at Altus than was collective efficacy or even experience and ability.
Theoretically an examination needs to be made on the relationship of collective
efficacy and performance with experience and ability as a potential moderator. There is
some evidence from Study 3 that in a learning or training environment of a complex
task, collective efficacy may not be important in task performance. Perhaps more
accurately put, collective efficacy seems to distinguish exceptional and average
performance only in operational environments. Results of Study 3 indicate that
collective efficacy does not distinguish such performance in a training environment. Is
there a theoretical reason why this relationship exists? Are experience and ability
moderators of the collective efficacy - performance relationship?
A potential answer to that question and also an area of both theoretical and
empirical work is the notion of "naive" 9r "inflated" collective efficacy. It seems in
Study 3, that extremely high collective efficacy levels simply failed to predict
performance in a meaningful way. But can there be a down-side to inflated collective
efficacy? Could it actually be harmful for collective efficacy to be naively high?
Perhaps it could result in reduced vigilance or attention to detail, or perhaps decreased
motivation. It should be clearly stated that I am making no inference that such dangers
exist based on the results of this study. Rather. I offer the question as a logical extension
to the high collective efficacy scores encountered during Study 3.
On a related manner, is there a way to construct questions in order to more
accurately gauge collective efficacy? In accordance with the efficacy literature (c.f. Gist
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and Mitchell, 1992) several of these efficacy questions were stated so as to ask about
specific performance attainments. It could be that unless individuals have the necessary
experience with the task or heed instruction from experts on performance levels, they
may possess improper performance level expectations. Mitchell, Hopper, Daniels,
George-Falvy, and James (1994) provided empirical evidence in their work on self
efficacy that predicted performance is harder to judge accurately with less experience: If
indeed performance levels were difficult to judge at Altus, the young crewmembers
might have easily fallen prey to inflated collective efficacy. This could especially be the
case in an environment like the Air Force with high efficacy "demand characteristics".

In this environment, three of Bandura's (1982) four categories of experience are utilized
to develop efficacy: 1. Vicarious experience (modeling of other military flyers), 2) verbal
persuasion (Aim High/ Air Force), and 3) physiological arousal (e.g. anxiety about the
checkride).
Each of the three studies on transactive memory offer a unique perspective on the
construct. Additionally, we have learned much about collective efficacy and
performance. The next section offers an overall discussion and critique of the three
studies, and follows with implications for practice, empirical work, and theory.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion

Overall Discussion
Taken together, the results of the lab and two field studies inform our
understanding of both transactive memory and performance. The field studies clearly
demonstrated that turnover or failure to train as integral teams can have an adverse effect
on transactive memory. All three studies showed a positive association between higher
transactive memory and some elements of performance. The lab study hints at why
transactive memory may translate into better performance. It seems that crewmembers
have higher situational awareness of events outside of the cockpit under high transactive
memory conditions. Perhaps the improved coordination as a result of knowing who
knows what, who does what, and who is good at what, allows crewmembers to focus on
important aspects of the situation versus having to closely monitor the actions of fellow
crewmembers. Furthermore, increased transactive memory may lessen the need for
verbal coordination of actions. Additionally, crewmembers may feel they are not
performing as well in a low transactive memory situation and are less confident they can
gauge other crewmember's situational states under these conditions.
The relationship of transactive memory and performance seems consistent across
studies. Transactive memory may help maintain less experienced crewmembers at the
"average level" of performance and keep them from falling to unsatisfactory levels.
However, there are indications that under conditions of high experience and ability that
collective efficacy may mediate the relationship between transactive memory and
performance. The field studies also indicate that transactive memory is an important
input into the crew's collective efficacy. The knowledge of one another add to the
team's confidence.
Collective efficacy was shown to be a powerful predictor of performance under
conditions of realistic collective efficacy judgments. Specifically, collective efficacy
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tends to separate the exceptional crew from the average crew under conditions of
experience and well-developed ability. However this relationship can be "shortcircuited" when team member's possess a naively inflated sense of collective efficacy.
Under these conditions transactive memory's effect on collective efficacy can be reduced
as well.
Experience and ability were demonstrated to be related to both performance and
collective efficacy, but not as strongly as one might think. For example, in Study 2
collective efficacy added a great deal of explanatory power about performance even after
experience and ability were controlled for. Experience and ability do influence
collective efficacy, but this relationship is also reduced under inflated efficacy ratings.
Practical Implications
Is it important to keep aircrews together during training and in operational
squadrons? That is one of the key questions that ignited this research. The answer
seems to be yes. If squadron leadership desires the highest level of performance, they
should strive to keep crews together. By keeping crews together, transactive memory is
increased. This increased knowledge of who knows what, who does what, and who is
good at what may allow the crews to have higher situational awareness outside of the
cockpit and greater ability to judge one another inside the cockpit. This will positively
influence performance. Additionally, a crew higher in transactive memory will be a
more confident crew. Results were clear that crews that know each others strengths well,
tend to be the crews that are more confident. This finding assumes greater importance,
when one considers the role of experience and ability. Experience and ability were both
positively related to collective efficacy in an operational environment. These
commodities are quickly being lost as the Air Force (and other services) endure retention
problems. Experience and ability are not quickly or easily replaced. Therefore, other
measures need to be utilized to keep crew efficacy high. Maintaining high transactive
. memory through crew integrity is one tool that squadron leadership can control and
influence.
Is the price one pays to keep the crew together. worth the additional performance
earned? Only the leadership can ultimately answer that question, but there are several
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factors to consider. Keeping crews together can be a burden from a scheduling
perspective; it is sometimes hard to keep individuals together to fly in this high tempo
operations environment. A potential compromise is offered: For routine missions, crew
integrity may not be as important. Crews should be able to perform proficiently under
these circumstances. However, whenever crews will be entering high stress, unknown
environments, I recommend that a "hard crew" be employed. Perhaps it would be wise ·
to have a few "hard crews" on hand for short notice deployments such as the Kosovo
crisis. However, the squadron leadership may not have such a luxury. As an alternative,
crews are sometimes deployed with short notice to a forward location where they then
wait for hostilities to begin. During this waiting period crews could have several training
flights together to increase both transactive memory and collective efficacy. This should
translate into a performance advantage that could make a difference in a crisis situation.
Anecdotally, the Air Force employed such a strategy during the Desert Shield
portion of the Southwest Asia campaign. When hostilities began under Desert Storm,
crews were already configured as "hard crews". Their success rate speaks for itself.
These studies provide empirical evidence for this practice.

It should also be mentioned that these results indicate that flying crewmembers
together from the same squadron. even without many flights together, has advantages.
These crews tend to have higher transactive memory from simply interacting in a flying
atmosphere. On bases housing several squadrons, or at forward locations with personnel
from several squadrons, I recommend that personnel from the same squadron fly together
as much as possible.
Limitations
The most salient of the limitations of this research has already been
acknowledged. All three studies suffered from a small sample size. Working with
natural teams whether in the lab or the field, can be expensive and time consuming. It is
difficult to assemble the various team members for research, especially when they are
busily engaged in their normal tasks and duties. Study 2 is a classic example of these
rigors. There were 73 indi Yi dual respondents, which translates into 19 crews for the
study. There were twenty crews evaluated during the Fairchild inspection. Evaluators
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had hoped to have at least 25, however, the Kosovo crisis erupted three days before the
inspection. Nine crews were deployed, resulting in a fewer number available for the
inspection. Evaluators were delighted to even have 20 crews at that point.
Keep in mind that there are several positives associated with the samples. The
lab study enjoyed one of the highest quality subject pools found anywhere in the
literature. All the aviators had over 1500 hours in military aircraft. Seven of the eight
were combat veterans of either the Vietnam or Persian Gulf War. One of the participants
has been the subject of an aviation book chapter with his three "MIG kills" in Vietnam.
These flight subjects offer greater validity in simulator studies than using college
students. The same can be said for the field studies where actual KC-135 crews,
evaluators, and aircraft were employed in the study. A study cannot be conducted in a
more realistic environment. It seems that the sample size trade-off for the quality of the
sample itself, was a good one.
Additionally, strong findings emerged using small sample sizes, indicating robust
phenomenon at work. For example, the collective efficacy relationships in Study 2
enjoyed correlations in the .60 range. Crew hardness translated into transactive memory
with correlations around .50 in both field studies. Transactive memory exhibited an
extremely consistent relationship with performance across field studies. The sample
sizes employed make these results even more impressive.
There are several potential confounds associated with Study 3. With no
investigator on site, data collection relied on volunteer efforts of several instructors at
Altus AFB. While their efforts are to be commended. they could not be expected to
exert that same effort as the Investigator in ensuring a high survey return rate. It is not
clear how many surveys were issued to crews. Surveys were issued from a central
dispatch desk. On occasions some crews did not pick up their survey package. On other
occasions crews picked up more than one package and then discarded the extra package.
Therefore. it is not known how many crews chose to _respond. However. threats of
response bias are greatly reduced by considering that I am sampling from a very
homogenous population. All the trainees at the base encountered similar selection
procedures into the military in general and into aviation in particular. Training at initial
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training flying assignments prior to Altus AFB is extremely standardized by the Higher
Headquarters Standardization and Evaluation Division. Headquarters prides itself on
consistency in training. It is very likely that each training crew at Altus was more similar
than different from the next aircrew.
The evaluator forms were kept simple. The investigator briefed many of the
evaluators on the specifics of the forms in late February, just prior to data collection. On
a separate occasion, the chief evaluators were briefed in additional detail and in tum
covered the form with their personnel at the weekly evaluator's meeting. Results of the
survey indicate that evaluators avoided "firewalling" their ratings. Firewalling is the
tendency to give all evaluatees the highest marks possible. The other major rating area,
Critiques per Crew, was to be translated from the official Air Force evaluation form onto
the researcher's evaluation form. The only confusion in this case, may be whether a
critique item could be attributable to crew coordination. In most cases, this would be a
clear call, however, if several critiques are related, it may be difficult to separate the
exact number attributable to crew coordination as discussed earlier.
Another draw back to Study 3 was the mixing of instructors with trainees during
the evaluation. For example, Crew 1 is having a checkride on the AC and the Co. The
Boom Operator and Navigator are both students earlier in the training sequence.
Meanwhile, Crew 2 is having a checkride on the AC and Co also. There are no other
trainees available, so permanent party instructors acting as regular crewmembers fill the
Boom Operator and Navigator positions. It can be argued that Crew 2 has it much easier
as they will not be required to monitor the other crewmembers as closely as they would
have to do with fellow trainees. They can then focus more on the task at hand.
Additionally, it could be more difficult for the Evaluator to distinguish if the good crew
coordination exhibited by Crew 2 is due to their crew coordination skills or due to the
presence of instructors on board. On the other hand, Crew 1 may possess excellent crew
coordination skills that are severely challenged by newer trainees on board.
While the possibility of these factors influencing the finding of Study 3 cannot be
ruled out, the fact that the "non-checked" positions on a checkride are randomly assigned
helps to rule out this possibility. Through randomization it is hoped that no systematic
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performance bias crept into the results. Randomization certainly makes such systematic
bias less probable. It was desired to have each checkride to be conducted with an
evaluatee in every position. However, real world constraints make this an impossibility.
The effects of instructors mixing with trainees is a condition that all skill and ability
levels have an equal chance of encountering. The same can be said for the issue of
mixing crewmembers flying their checkride with trainees flying at a much earlier phase
in their program.
Due to a shortage of qualified subjects, Study 1 was unable to obtain a fully
counterbalanced design. The counterbalance is employed to protect against any
difference in advisors. Sixteen subjects would have been required for such a
counterbalance. Therefore, the first half of the counterbalance design was employed. Ttests indicated no difference between subjects during the first week of testing, when any
adverse effects due to a difference in the advisors would emerge. Additionally, only
Week 2 results were used in the transactive memory analysis; further eliminating the
possibility of performance differences due to experimental design.
The final limitation to the field studies concerns the issue of the measurement of
transactive memory. It was hoped that the three ·components would exhibit the high
correlations found by Moreland and colleagues (1998), but they did not. Following their
suggestion. the individual components of transactive memory were used to investigate
relationships with the criterion variables and Strength was found to be a reliable
predictor across studies. The primary measurement issue deals with the Accuracy
component. It seems clear from the literature that Accuracy is an important component
of transactive memory. In both Study 2 and 3, the Accuracy component exhibited very
low mean levels. As a result, the predictive validity of transactive memory may have
suffered. ·when Accuracy was removed from the transactive memory measurement, the
construct showed vastly improved criterion related validity. Further studies should
endeavor to more precisely measure this component.
Future Research Directions
The studies described here point to several avenues of future research. Studies 2
and 3 revealed two different patterns for the collective efficacy - performance
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relationship. Under normal levels of experience, collective efficacy was a potent
predictor of performance. However, under training conditions, collective efficacy
demonstrated practically no relationship with performance. Is experience and ability a
moderator of the Collective efficacy - Performance relationship? Further studies,
especially in the field, should be conducted by manipulating experience levels and
examining if and how the collective efficacy - performance link is changed.
Alternatively, collective efficacy and performance could be contrasted for two
conditions, a training condition and a "mature condition" where the task has been well
learned. Another interesting test would be a longitudinal approach where collective
efficacy - performance relationships are tested for crews during training and then later
once the skills have been mastered.
On a related matter, collective efficacy was found to be highly positively related
to transactive memory in Study 2, but much less so in Study 3. Again, does the
relationship of collective efficacy and transactive memory change depending on the
training or experience level of the participant? This issue could be addressed in similar
manner to the collective efficacy - performance issue described above.
The differences in the transactive memory, collective efficacy, and performance
relationships listed above could be attributed to a false or naive sense of collective
efficacy. Study 3 revealed inflated collective efficacy levels on the part of new trainees.
Can these inflated collective efficacy levels be harmful to performance? Is it possible
that such inflated levels may lead to a false sense of security and a resulting lack of
vigilance. Alternatively, the inflated levels could lead the subject to attempt a
performance level that could be harmful to the subject or others involved. It could also
be that these inflated levels simply "wash-out" any predictive power on the part of
collective efficacy and are otherwise not harmful. Testing of these hypotheses would be
difficult. Manipulating collective efficacy levels in order to test for dangerous results
would be unethical.
The inflated collective efficacy issue also highlights the importance of
researchers thinking through the efficacy questions posed to respondents in order to
protect against such inflated ratings. However, as was seen in these exa~ples, the
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questions had a very specific nature and were still inflated for the training groups.
Researchers cannot control all of the subject's bents.
Future research should also focus on how to best measure the Accuracy
component of transactive memory. Moreland and colleagues ( 1998) were able to
consistently measure Accuracy when it came to a very concrete result such as wiring a
radio. They found Accuracy levels comparable to both Agreement and Strength levels.
Study 2 and 3 required a more abstract Accuracy estimate, that of defining another
person's strength from a forced choice list. This task proved to be too difficult. The
lesson learned seems to be that the more abstract the Accuracy estimation, the greater the
chance of poor results. If the task is comprised of mostly abstract components, it may be
difficult to find a suitable accuracy measurement. There is a balance to be reached in
finding an accuracy component that is not too simple (resulting in ceiling effects) or as
was in this case, an accuracy component that is too difficult (resulting in floor effects).
Perhaps accuracy questions should focus more on specific situations that a team may
encounter. So given a certain situation, how would you expect Team Member A to
react? . This may be a more fruitful approach to accuracy and merits further research.
Researchers should also continue to pursue transactive memory work mindful of
the consistent results of the field studies using only the Strength component. It may be
that the ease of measurement, coupled with the predictive power of the Strength
component, may render the more difficult collection of the other two components of
transactive memory of little value. This could potentially provide practitioners with a
simple tool to gauge team transactive memory levels quickly and efficiently.
Alternatively, research should be pursued on inaccurate Strength estimation. A false or
inaccurate sense of Strength could be detrimental. This situation could arise when
members are in the same organization for a long period of time, but not on the same
team. Once put on a team, the members may feel they know each other's strengths well,
when in fact they do not. Would this be harmful? Members in this situation may
actually take longer to figure out the· actual strengths of fellow crewmembers.
Future research should be focused on potential boundary conditions of transactive
memory. There may be context contingencies that increase the value of transactive
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memory. Perhaps transactive memory would be most value in novel, unusual, or crisis
situations requiring flexibility on the part of the team. These non-routine situations may
present several possible solutions and the team high in transactive memory may better
gauge the best solution for that team. The team high in transactive memory may be
better able to compensate for weaknesses in team by simply being aware that they exist.
This would allow even a team with poor skill levels to perform better than they may
otherwise. Furthermore, team high in transactive memory may be better able to select
replacements for departing team members as they are acutely aware of the knowledge
that has departed with the outgoing member. Certain tasks may moderate the importance
of transactive memory to the team. In a similar vein the presence or absence of assigned
team role may increase the importance of transactive memory. It is possible that teams
without assigned roles would receive greater benefits from transactive memory as they
may be more flexible in how they operate.
Finally, research is needed on how to develop or build up transactive memory in
a team. Time on the team is clearly one avenue to develop transactive memory.
However, there may be further steps that a team can take. Rulke and Rau (1997) found
that early in the team's life cycle, teams employ a strategy of small spiral encoding
cycles of question-expertise-coordination. It seems that this practice would be beneficial
for mature teams as well. Other group techniques such as Pulling apart Success
exercises could also facilitate the development of transactive memory. Groups do not
tend to re-assess themselves naturally, so this practice may require a team intervention.
Another important time for such exercises may be when outgoing team members are
replaced by newcomers. With arrivals and departures, this spiral encoding cycle could
be beneficial. In groups with an assigned leader, the leader could institute such practices
to increase the team's transactive memory and performance.

Summary
Taken as a whole, the results of these studies point to the positive relationship
between transactive memory and performance. Though these effects were not
exceptionally strong, a leader desiring to improve performance should take heed.
Training teams in groups and keeping them together as much as possible during normal
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real world functioning, should result in improved performance. Additionally, the
powerful role of collective efficacy in determining performance in mature teams was
highlighted. This performance difference may be what separates the "exceptional'' from
the "average". Means to improve collective efficacy include increasing experience,
ability, and the team's transactive memory.
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Appendix A
Training checklist for the pilot
F-22 Simulator Training Checklist

1. Conduct training on Fly Training: Dogfighting, Flight Model: Realistic , # enemy aircraft 3, Enemy
skill level: Harmless.
2. Review stick device
-left/right tum, climb/descent
-throttle operation
-afterburner(* key)
-trigger function
-missile launch button
-buttons on the joy stick
2. Allow subject time to practice basic flight maneuvers
left/right tum
climb/decent
3. Cover practice/evasive maneuvers.
split S (requires 6,000 ft.) to accomplish. Used when missile is (1 mi< missile< 2 mi) and
coming from the 4 to 8 o'clock position. Or tum hard into the missile. Tum into missile coming from the
front.
4. Go over the Head's Up Display (HUD).
Begin at the Heading indicator and go counterclockwise
heading indicator
airspeed is in Knots Indicated Airspeed or KIAS often referred to as indicated airspeed
M=mach
G = g's on the pilot. Grey/blackout can occur at greater than 6 sustained g's. -1.5 red-out
A= AOA or Angle of Attack. Not important to this simulation
F = Fuel (Not important)
Weapon selected and number of weapons remaining
AIM 120C good for 5-15 nautical miles Triangle sight
AIM 9X good for within 5 nautical miles Circle sight
G480 guns dashed circle sight (small circle= where bullets would hit 2,250' away)
· NOTE each of these weapons brings up a different sight. Weapons will be further
demonstrated later in the training period.
Bottom center small triangle is the turn and slip indicator N/A for this simulation
Bottom right hand comer: #/type of waypoint, relative degrees to next waypoint and
distance to waypoint in nautical miles
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Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) to next waypoint under current heading and airspeed.
Target List
Type of aircraft and position in the shootlist (in parentheses)
altitude of enemy aircraft
Heading and distance to enemy aircraft
Bogies airspeed
VC = closure speed of bogey
Altimeter in MSL (Mean Sea Level) also capable of giving Radar Altimeter by pushing
key. MSL is fine for this simulation

Shift A

Missile range bar. Describe and emphasis having the dot in range before firing
left bar: weapons effectiveness range, dot= bogey
thin t bar: max possible range of weapon
right bar: bogey's best weapon max range, arrow= your aircraft
Also cover Shoot cue
Shoot comes up in circle, dot indicates where the bogey is according to the missile's view.
Heading bug
5. Cover important keyboard keys
* = afterburner
B = Speed brake
Below is important only if not using the throttle buttons
Enter = toggles through the weapons
S = brings up shootlist / changing weapons deletes shoot list
T = toggles through the shoot list
Tab = warp speed
6. Practice a few air to air engagements.
NOTE: ENSURE PILOT'S HEADS DOWN DISPLAY IS COVERED
emphasize proper weapon selection
emphasize how to bring up a shoot list
emphasize the missile in range bar on the HUD
emphasize the different sights (shapes), shoot cues, and target vector bar
emphasize use of the HUD as the Head's Down Display will not be available.
emphasize evasive maneuvers from incoming missiles and SAMs
-must listen to advisor
-split S and turns into the missile
-what to do in case of black out ~ lessen the stick pressure or release depending on
position
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7. Fill out a practice SA (situational awareness) form
-wingmen are on the wing, unless sent elsewhere.
-airspeed, altitude, and aircraft attitude.
8. Review how to handle wingmen Hit U, ?, ?
- wingmen, two on the right wing and one on the left unless sent elsewhere
9. Begin the criterion test
NOTE: ENSURE PILOT'S HEADS DOWN DISPLAY IS COVERED
twice shooting down all three aircraft without being shot down
at least twice during the criterion test have them stop and verbally state what they would put on
the SA form
NOTE: recommend 25,000 ft on altitude (good for maneuvering) and
hit E and V for auto chaff, flare, and ECM.

BEGINNING THE MISSION
1. What buttons for the mission "fly mission" ?
2. Hit E, V for auto chaff, flare, and ECM
3. Hit A for autopilot, TAB x 3 to go on warp speed times three.
4. Once near the border, hit???? TAB to come out of warp speed
5. Go on Pause (P button), fill out sim time on the form.
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Situational Awareness Measures
Time of test _ _ _ _ _ _ (from F22 clock)

NOTE All of the questions refer to the time since the last test
errors
Wingmen
Twinkletoes 2
Distance_ _ _ __
Direction_ _ _ __
Twinkletoes 3
Distance._ _ _ __
Direction_ _ _ __
Twinkletoes 4
Distance_ _ _ __
Direction_ _ _ __
Bogies? (yin)_ _
Bogey 1, type_ _ __
Distance_ _ _ __
Direction_ _ _ __
Bogey 2, type_ _ __
Distance_ _ _ __
Direction_ _ _ __
Bogey 3, type._ _ __
Distance_ _ _ __
Direction._ _ _ __
Bogey 4, type._ _ __
Distance_ _ _ __
Direction._ _ _ __
Bogey 5, type._ _ __
Distance._ _ _ __
Direction._ _ _ __

...............__ (±20%)
..............._(±30deg)
..............._(±20%)
..............._(±30deg)
..............._(±20%)
..............._(±30deg)

...............__ (±20%)
..............._(±30deg)
..............._(±20%)
..............._(±30deg)
...............__ {±20%)
..............._{±30deg)
...............__ (±20%)
..............._(±30deg)
..............._(±20%)
..............._(±30deg)

Aircraft
Altitude _ __
Attitude._ _ __
Speed._ _ __
Wpn selected._ __

...............__ (±20%)
..............._(±20%) ·

Weapons shot? (y/n),_ __
number_ _ _ __
type_ _ _ _ __
result._ _ _ _ __

Total questions_ _
Total errors,_ __
Please turn the page
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Value of Communication Perception Measures
(test 1)
**The information you provide about your partner will be confidential**

1

2

3

4
5

6

7

All the
time

None

None
could have
done it without

Essential
Could not have
done it without

Amount of
communication

Value of
communication

Instigator of
communication

Pilot
100%

Advisor
100%

Very
poor

Very
good

Advisor's
performance

Very
poor

Very
good

Pilot's
performance

Very
low

Very
high

Your partner's
SA

Not
confident

Very
confident

Your confidence
in. accuaracy of
your response to
question 6

Please turn the page
in preparation for the
next test
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Performance Measures
. DATA SHEET ViP2

, PILOT

Date._ _ _ _ _ __
Trial number _ _ _ _ _ __
Experimenter_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Subject 1 (pilot) _ _ _ _ __
Subject 2 (advisor)_ _ _ _-,--__
1) Trial start time (from F22 clock) _ _ _ _ __

Mission description

RESULTS
Result_ _ _ _ __

BOA._ _ _ _ __
Effectiveness_ __
Enemy ale _ _ __
2) Mission end time
(from F22 clock)
Mission duration (2-1 )_ _ __
How ended (crash, shot down etc)

Time (real) _ _ _ _ _ __
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Videotape Coding Form
GROUP CODE
Please rate each team on the following items based upon your observation of the videotapes.
1. Please rate the degree to which members remembered different aspects of the task (e.g.
location of bogies, location of wingmen, weapons selected, effectiveness of weapons, etc.)
1
2
3
both
remembering the
same things

4

5

6

7

each
remembering
different things

2. Please rate the degree to which individual team members were responsible for (or focused
on) different tasks within the mission. (e.g. avoiding ground threats, engaging the enemy,
specific maneuvers, weapons selected, navigation, threat identification, etc.)

1
2
3
responsibility for
tasks had little
overlap

4

5

6

7
responsibility for
tasks had a great
deal of overlap

3. Please rate the degree of task coordination (working smoothly) between team members.
1
2
3
team
members
do not
coordinate
with each other
at all

4

5

6

7
team members
coordinate with
each other a
great deal

4. Please count the incidences of confusion (lack of understanding) in communication between
team members
[Note: clarification is not confusion]
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5. Please rate the degree to which team members sequenced their communication effectively
and appropriately (focus on communication, verbal sequencing). [Note: stepping on each other]

1
2
3
very ineffective
sequencing

4

5

6

7
Very effective
sequencing

6. Please rate the degree of cooperation between team members
1
2
very little
cooperation

3

4

5

6

7
a great deal
of cooperation

7. Please rate the degree of trust (in judgment and ability) between team members

NI A will get from the self-reports

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3
trust each other
a great deal

do not
trust each
other at all

8. Please rate the degree the amount of criticism (negative communication, can be tone of
voice) between team members
1
2
Nonexistent

3

4

5

6

7
occurred frequently

9. Please rate the degree to which team members behaved (including non-verbals, sarcasm) as if
they were frustrated with one another.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Nonexistent

7
occurred frequently

10. Please rate the degree to which team members accepted procedural suggestions from one
another.
1
3
2
Non-acceptance
or heavy resistance

4

5

6

7
Open acceptance
no resistance

I_

109

AppendixF
Sample Crewmember Form Fairchild
COPILOT'S QUESTIONNAIRE
PLEASE COMPLETE INDIVIDUALLY!
Date of Flight _ _ Call Sign _ _
Please circle the most accurate response or fill in the blank

Background
1.

My crew position is

AC

Co

Nav

Boom
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Please check the most appropriate box

Crew Responsibilities

11. Which crewmember generally takes responsibility
for maintaining and updating the weather
information?

Boom

Nav

Co

AC

D

D

D

D

Boom

Nav

Co

AC

D

D

D

D

Please check the most appropriate box

Crew Skills

19. On this crew, the person most "expert" in his or her
aircraft systems knowledge is the
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Please check the most appropriate box
Very

Crew Strengths

limited
knowledge

Some
Moderate
Knowledge Knowledge

Substantial
Knowledge

As well as
you can
know them

23. How well do you know the strengths of this AC
in his/her crew position?

D

D

D

D

D

25. How well do you know the strengths of this
Boom in his/her crew position?

D

D

D

D

D

Please check the most appropriate box
Crew Coordination

Technical
Proficiency (e.g.
landing,
navigating,
refueling)

Systems and EP
knowledge(of
systems they are
responsible for)

D

D

D

Crew Strengths cont.

26. If I had to pick one I would say that this AC' s
greatest strength as a crewmember is
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Please check the most
appropriate box

Performance

47. How confident are you
that at least one
member of your crew
will receive an
"Outstanding
Performance OP" or
"Exceptionally
Qualified EQ" rating
on this checkride?

50. Compared to the
average crew, I think
this crew's checkride
performance will be:

Strongly
Agree

Agree

D

D

Below Average

D

Slightly
Agree

D

Slightly Below

D

Thank you for participating!

Avg

D

D

Neutral

D

Average

D

Slightly
Disagree

D

D

Disagree

D

Slightly Above
Avg.

D

Strongly
Disgree

D

Above

D

Average

D
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Sample Evaluator Form
CHECK NAVIGATOR'S QUESTIONNAIRE

Date of Flight _ _ Call Sign _ _
Please check the most appropriate box

Crew Evaluation

1.

The following crewmember AC
received checks on this
flight.(circle all that apply)

3.

Taken as a crew, overall
this crew's checkride
performance was: NOTE:
it is vital that you be
accurate in your
assessment. A void rating
inflation and DO NOT
firewall ratings.

Nav

Co

Below

Slightly Below

Average

Avg

D

D

Boom

Slightly Above

Above

Average

Avg.

Average

D

D

D

Please check the most appropriate box

Nav Evaluation

4.

5.

Taken as a individual, overall
this individual's checkride
performance was: NOTE: it is
vital that you be accurate in
your assessment. A void rating
inflation and DO NOT firewall
ratings.

From my observations of the
flight and evaluations on the
ground, at the present time I
rate this evaluatee's greatest
strength as

Below

Slightly

Slightly

Above

Average

Below Avg

Average

Above Avg.

Average

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

Crew Coordination

Technical Proficiency

Systems and EP

(e.g. landing, navigating,

knowledge (of systems

refueling)

they are responsible for)

Overall Checkride Result: EQ Q Q2 Q3
How many critique items (if any) could have been avoided with better crew coordination? _ _
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Cover letter
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
University of Washington

Seattle, Washington
Dear Copilot
The AMC DO has directed me to examine what makes an effective Air Force crew. I am an active duty Air
Force Major and KC-135 pilot, currently working on a doctoral degree at the University of Washington.
My dissertation focuses on aircrew effectiveness.
I am specifically interested in aircraft with multiple crew positions. The KC-135 is an ideal aircraft for this
study. The most efficient way to address this issue is through the use of a short questionnaire. All answers
to the survey will be strictly confidential. The Air Force will never receive individual answers. Only group
level information will be presented to the Air Force and the University of Washington. Call signs are
requested in order to combine crew answers.
Your honest and voluntary answers will help complete my aircrew effectiveness research and will also help
the Air Force learn more about aircrew composition issues.
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely
//signed//
Daryl R. Smith, Major, USAF
School of Business Administration
University of Washington

1.

INSTRUCTIONS
Complete the individual survey for your crew position.

2.

Please fill out the survey individually, please do not discuss answers with one another.

3.

Place the individual survey back into the large envelope.

4.

Once all crewmembers have completed the survey please seal the envelope.

5.

Turn over the sheet to begin the survey.
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Sample Crewmember Form Altus
COPILOT'S QUESTIONNAIRE
PLEASE COMPLETE INDIVIDUALLY!

Date of Fli ht_ _Call Si n_ _
Please circle the most accurate response or fill in the blank

Background

1.

Reminder: This is the Copilot's
questionnaire

Please fill in the blank

Experience with the Crew

7.

How many previous times have you flown
with the Aircraft Commander assigned to
this sortie
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Please check the most appropriate box

Crew Responsibilities
11. Which crewmember generally takes
responsibility for maintaining and updating
the weather information?

Boom

D

Nav
D

Co

AC

D

D

Nav
D

Co

AC

D

D

Please check the most appropriate box

Crew Skills
19. On this crew, the person most "expert" in his or
her aircraft systems knowledge is the

Boom

D
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Please check the most appropriate box
Very
limited
knowledge

Some
Knowledge

23. How well do you know the strengths of this AC
in his/her crew position?

D

D

D

D

D

25. How well do you know the strengths of this
Boom in his/her crew position?

D

D

D

D

D

Crew Strengths

Please check the most appropriate box

Moderate Substantial
Knowledge Knowledge

As well as
you can
know them

Crew Coordination

Technical
Proficiency (e.g.
landing, navigating,
refueling)

Systems and EP
knowledge(of
systems they are
responsible for)

D

D

D

Crew Strengths cont.
26. Ifl had to pick one I would say that this AC's
greatest strength as a crewmember is

Please check the most appropriate box

Interpersonal Relations.

Casual
Acquaintance

Some
Moderate Substantial Know them
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge very well

30. How well do you know the AC on a personal
basis (off the job)?

D

D

D

D

D

32. How well do you know the Nav on a
personal basis (off the job)?

D

D

D

D

D

L

118

Appendix I (Continued)
Please check the most appropriate box

Strongly

Strongly

Process Assessment

41. Compared with the "average" crew (as
far as smoothly and efficiently and
cooperatively working together to
accomplish the mission) this crew is
more like the

43. I feel other members of this crew are
critical of how I execute my flight
duties

Neutral

Disagree

Disagree

Best

Avg

Worst

Crew

Crew

Crew

D

D

Never

Rarely

D

D

D

D

Sometimes Frequently

D

D

D

Always

D
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Please check the most appropriate
box

Performance

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Slightly
Agree

Neutral

D

D

D

D

45. I think this crew has the
knowledge needed to
successfully complete
this checkride.

47. How confident are you
that at least one member
of your crew will receive
an "Outstanding
Performance OP" or
"Exceptionally Qualified
EQ" rating on this
checkride?

49. How confident are you that
no member of your crew
will receive more than
three downgrades on this
checkride?

Slightly Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Disgree

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D

D
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